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INTRODUCTION

The year is 1993 and the Hawaii Supreme Court has just declared-as a
matter of state constitutional law-that the state prohibition of same-sex
marriage constitutes gender discrimination. I Within a few years, thirty-five
states enacted laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages and
Congress, responding "to a very particular development in the State of
Hawaii," 2 enacted the Defense of Marriage Act. 3 In Hawaii, voters
overwhelmingly approved a state constitutional amendment authorizing the
legislative prohibition of same-sex marriage. 4 For Bill Eskridge, the Hawaii
decision was disastrous, "provok[ing] the biggest antigay backlash since the
McCarthy era." 5 For Andy Koppelman, however, Hawaii "put the issue of
same-sex marriage on the national agenda" and, in so doing, "was a triumph for
gays."6
Fast forward to 2003 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court's ruling that,
under the Massachusetts Constitution, same-sex couples have a right to marry. 7
Throughout the nation, Republicans seized upon this issue, using it to bolster
their prospects in the 2004 elections. President Bush called for a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage; congressional leaders pushed both for
that amendment and for legislation stripping federal courts of jurisdiction in
same-sex marriage cases; state officials backed constitutional amendment
proposals in thirteen states. 8 And while there is some dispute about whether the
same-sex marriage issue was decisive in President Bush's reelection or in

I. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court specifically
held that the statute was a sex-based classification subject to the strict scrutiny test under the
Equal Protection Clause, and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
whether the statute was justified by compelling state interests.
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).

4. Election 98-Voters In 4 States Tum Back Gay Rights Initiatives-Referendums
Against Same-Sex Marriages Win in Alaska and Hawaii, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 5,

1998, at A6. For additional discussion of the interplay of social and political forces following
the Hawaii decision, see infra text accompanying notes 287-90.
5. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CML UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS 26 (2002).
6. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 150 (2002).
7. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
8. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REv.
431, 460, 463, 466, 477 n.330 (2005). For additional discussion of out-of-state and national
political developments following the Massachusetts decision, see id. at 459-72.
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Republican victories in Congress,9 there is little question that the
Massachusetts decision did not sit well with a majority of Americans-as
revealed both in public opinion polls and in voter approval of all thirteen samesex marriage ban proposals. 10 In Massachusetts, however, same-sex marriage
carried the day-not only did 2004 efforts to derail the court's decision fail,
Massachusetts voters rewarded opponents of a proposed constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage (reelecting all opponents while ousting some proponents of
the ban). 11
Both the popular press and academic commentators largely ignored the fact
that Massachusetts voters stood behind the same-sex marriage decision. Mike
Klarman discussed only out-of-state "backlash" in his assessment of the
decision; Gerry Rosenberg said the decision, "perhaps more than any other
modem case, highlights the folly of Progressives turning to litigation in the face
of legislative hostility"; Jeff Rosen said that the decision "created a dramatic
backlash," linking out-of-state events to "national opinion polls" disapproving
of same-sex marriage. 12 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson also lamented the
proliferation of constitutional amendments that followed in the wake of the
Massachusetts decision, claiming that constitutions should be "articulations of
fundamental rather than positive law" and that the amendment craze that
followed
the
Massachusetts
decision
exemplified
the
"overconstitutionalization" of state constitutions. 13

9. Tonja Jacobi, for example, has argued that Republican victories in 2004 should not
be linked to the Massachusetts decision. Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political
Power of Remedial Delay in Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 11, 41-52
(2006).
10. Public opinion poll data is discussed in Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
Same-sex marriage bans are discussed in Klarman, supra note 8, at 459-72. For a competing
argument about the linkage between the Massachusetts decision and state initiatives, see
Jacobi, supra note 9, at 29-33.
II. See Jacobi, supra note 9, at 39-41. For additional discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 315-19; see also Tonja Jacobi, How Massachusetts Got Gay Marriage:
The Intersection of Popular Opinion, Legislative Action, and Judicial Power, 15 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 219 (2006).
12. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 111 (2006); Klarman, supra note
8, at 459-72 (cataloguing out-of-state backlash); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster:
Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 812 (2006) ("The
result of these judicial victories has been nothing short of disastrous for the right to same-sex
marriage."). Other articles discussing national backlash include Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash
Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its
Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006); Kenneth K. Hsu, Why the Politics of

Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal and Strategic Approaches on Both Sides of the Debate
on Same-Sex Marriage, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 275 (2006); Mary Ellen Rayment, Comment,
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: The Wrong Step at the Wrong Time for SameSex Marriages, 82 DENY. U. L. REv. 109 (2004).
13 . J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism: What's a
Constitution For?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 573-78 (2006).
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Reactions to the Massachusetts and Hawaii decisions are diverse in many
respects. At the same time, the most visible academic and popular commentary
about the political impact of these decisions focused on national concerns.
National measures of what constitutions should look like and what
consequences matter have been deployed in leading law review and popular
press assessments of these decisions. 14 The idea that out-of-state backlash
might be a poor metric for judging state court decision-making has not been a
focal point of leading academic commentary. The idea that state constitutional
systems are fundamentally different from each other has played next to no role
in assessments of these and other same-sex marriage decisions.
Even though it is understandable that national publications would focus on
questions of nationwide concern, 15 there is a baseline problem when it comes
to academic commentary about the consequences of state court decisionmaking. State supreme court justices have jurisdiction over a single state, not
the entire nation. They are experts in the law and politics of their state. 16 That
is not to say that they cannot learn from the experiences of other states, nor is it
to say that they do not care about their national reputation or about whether
their decisions will advance favored policies throughout the country. 17 At the
same time, there is a striking disconnect between commentary about the
consequences of state supreme court decision-making and the actual
jurisdiction and expertise of state courts. Along the same lines, critiques of the
length and sweep of state constitutions often employ a baseline that is moored
to the Federal Constitution. 18 The fact that each state is somewhat autonomous
and that state constitutions may reflect distinctive political, historical, and
cultural moments is sometimes lost in this analysis.
In the pages that follow, I will advance a state-centered understanding of
state constitutionalism. My focus will be on consequences, that is, the
incentives and expertise of state supreme court justices to think about the
consequences of their decisions. My analysis, in part, will draw on a rich,
14. See supra notes 5-8, 12-13 and accompanying text. In this Symposium, Erwin
Chemerinsky makes use of nationalistic measures to assess "[t]he story of marriage equality"
and, in so doing, calls for the U.S. Supreme Court to fill the breach on this issueestablishing a nationwide right to same-sex marriage. Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Two
Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1695, 1695 (2010). There are two
notable exceptions to the backlash commentators (both political scientists): Tonja Jacobi and
Tom Keck. See Jacobi, supra note 11; Jacobi, supra note 9; Thomas M. Keck, Beyond
Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 151 (2009).
15. By way of contrast, regional law reviews have published state-focused pieces about
these cases. For example, the Hawaii and Vermont Law Reviews published symposium
issues to discuss their respective state supreme court decisions on same-sex marriage. See
Symposium, Same-Sex Marriage: The Debate in Hawai'i and the Nation, 22 U. HAW. L.
REv. 1 (2000); Symposium, Vermont Civil Unions, 25 VT. L. REv. 1 (2000).
16. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 218-32.
17. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
18. See Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 574.
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nuanced literature about whether and when courts should take backlash risks
into account. Like the above-described scholarship on same-sex marriage, this
scholarship is largely nationalistic in focus. It either deals explicitly with the
U.S. Supreme Court or makes use of theoretical and empirical models which
assume life tenure for judges, a difficult-to-amend constitution, the availability
of justiciability-based avoidance techniques, and a large information problem
for judges determining whether there will be outrage and what the
consequences of that outrage will be. 19 Indeed, with the very important
exception of state court responses to judicial election risks, 20 legal academics
and political scientists are yet to grapple with, among other things, the question
of whether state supreme courts should make use of certiorari denials to steer
clear of politically controversial topics and whether state supreme courts should
take into account the potential nullification of their decisions through a
constitutional amendment. 21
In this Article, I will provide a preliminary assessment of what
consequences state supreme court justices are likely to take into account. I will
also consider the ways in which a state supreme court justice can take out-ofstate consequences into account. By focusing on the im~lementation of state
court decisions and the reputation of state supreme courts, 2 I will not comment
on whether state courts should engage in doctrinal percolation-that is, the
practice of one state court looking to another state court's interpretation of
analogous constitutional provisions. Likewise, by looking to the ways that state
supreme court justices interface with other political actors and voters, I will not
address the methodological question of whether state courts should rely on
state-specific sources (the text and history of their state constitutions) and, in so
doing, "develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law. " 23

19. This is true, for example, of Cass Sunstein's fine article about whether judges
should consider backlash risks. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their
Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155 (2007). Indeed, that article's discussion
of same-sex marriage explicitly considers the prospect of a federal constitutional amendment
that might override a U.S. Supreme Court decision. See id. at 162-75.
20. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 162-202.
21. The question of whether state courts should employ justiciability barriers to avoid
politically knotty issues is explored in Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive
Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (highlighting
differences between state and federal systems in arguing that state courts should not look to
federal court norms but, instead, should develop a less constraining, more state-specific
approach toward justiciability limits).
22. For reasons I will detail in Part II, my consideration of a state supreme court
justice's interest in his or her personal reputation and the reputation of his or her court is
somewhat at variance with the dominant political science models.
23. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 764 (1992). This question has dominated much of the discourse over state
constitutionalism. For a survey of this literature, see. Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions

and New Issues: National Lessons from Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage of
Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REv. 73, 106-22 (2001).
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My analysis will proceed in three parts. Part I will explain why academics
often look to nationalistic norms in assessing state supreme court decisionmaking and why it is that state constitutions are fundamentally different from
the Federal Constitution and from each other. Part I will also explain how it is
that states borrow both from each other and from the Federal Constitution.
Consequently, although state constitutional provisions cannot simply be
lumped together into some unified view of state constitutionalism, states are
part of a national system and, as such, can learn from each other in important
ways. Part I will also pave the way for subsequent discussion of whether state
supreme courts should take implementation concerns into account-looking at
provisions of state constitutions governing direct democracy, judicial elections,
and the power of state courts to sidestep issues by denying certiorari.
Part II will shift the focus to the question of whether state courts have
either the incentive or the capacity to be consequentialists. After providing a
brief overview of the dominant political science models governing U.S.
Supreme Court decision-making, Part II will sort out what those models
suggest about state supreme court decision-making. In so doing, Part II will
examine whether state supreme court justices are likely to take account of
judicial elections, ballot initiatives, and other implementation concerns
(including out-of-state backlash). Part II, moreover, will assess the capacity of
state supreme courts to assess backlash risks. Throughout this discussion, I will
call attention to the ways that states are different from each other but can learn
from each other. In particular, fundamental differences in state constitutional
systems and state norms highlight profound differences in backlash risks; at the
same time, state justices can look to the experiences of other states in assessing
in-state backlash risks.
Part III will link Parts I and II by considering the ways that state supreme
court justices can assess in-state backlash risks by looking to the unique
features of their own constitution, to the political norms of their states, and to
the experiences of other states. The focus will be a case study on same-sex
marriage. Initially, I will highlight how state courts, in fact, take into account
both the design of their constitution and in-state political norms. I will then
explain how state supreme court justices can also assess potential in-state
backlash risks by considering the experiences of other states. Part III therefore
highlights how state supreme courts are at once distinctive and part of a
nationwide system and, in so doing, shows how state-centered
constitutionalism can facilitate the shaping of constitutional values throughout
the country.
I. WHY STATE-CENTERED CONSTITUTIONALISM?

State constitutions are widely varied but also part of a national system in
which states borrow from each other and the national Constitution. In this way,
state supreme courts need to be sensitive both to their autonomy (as
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independent states with distinctive constitutional traditions) and to their
interconnectedness (as part of a national system in which states learn from each
other). In this Part, I will sketch out how it is that states are at once different
and connected-highlighting some of the basic differences among state
constitutions and differences between state and federal constitutional systems.
Before sketching out similarities and differences among state constitutions, I
will provide an explanation of sorts for why it is that legal academics often look
at state constitutional issues in nationalistic terms.
A. State Constitutionalism and the Pursuit ofNational Constitutional Values

Over the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S. Supreme
Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in their home states
and throughout the nation. State supreme courts decide more than ten thousand
cases each year,Z 4 roughly twenty percent of which involve state constitutional
issues. 25 The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, now issues around seventy-five
decisions a year, around forty percent of which involve constitutional issues. 26
To put these numbers into sharper focus, the California Supreme Court now
issues more opinions about state constitutional law than the U.S. Supreme
Court issues decisions about federal constitutionallaw. 27
Beyond the staggering disparity in the volume of constitutional law
decisions, state supreme court decision-making increasingly defines the
meaning of constitutional rights throughout the country. In particular, because
state supreme courts speak the last word about the meaning of state
constitutional law, 28 state courts may use their constitutions to provide
24. See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION 1 ( 1988). Some of these decisions are unsigned; there are approximately
8,000 signed opinions each year. This guesstimate is based on information found in the
Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State Courts (where forty-three states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico reported issuing around 7,500 signed opinions in
recent years). See Nat'! Ctr. for State Courts, Research: Court Statistics Project,
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Researchlcsp/CSP_Main _page.html (last visited May 1, 20 I 0)
(reporting number of signed opinions by state at tb1.17).
25. Gardner, supra note 23, at 780 (extrapolating from a sample of seven states).
26. For information on the number of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, see
of
the
United
States
Courts,
U.S.
Courts,
Judicial
Business
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (last visited May 1, 2010) (listing Supreme
Court docket information per year at tbl.A-1). For information on the number of
constitutional cases, see Richard A. Posner, Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv.
31,37-38 (2005).
27. In 2005, for example, the California Supreme Court issued thirty-seven opinions
dealing with state constitutional issues. This was found by performing a Westlaw search with
the parameters (T0(92) HE(CONSTITUTION! UNCONSTITUTIONAL!)) & (CO(HIGH)
& DA(2005)), and counting the cases that had state constitutional law questions. In 2005, the
U.S. Supreme Court issued thirty opinions dealing with federal constitutional issues. The
Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REv. 415,430 tbl.3 (2005).
28. The U.S. Supreme Court put it this way: states have the "sovereign right to adopt in
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constitutional protections above the floor set by the U.S. Supreme Court. State
supreme courts have done so in numerous settings, rejecting U.S. Supreme
Court rulings on school finance, disparate impact proofs of discrimination,
voter registration laws, abortion funding, religious liberty protections, takings,
same-sex sodomy, and a host of criminal procedure protections. 29 State
supreme courts have also been path-breakers, paving the way for Supreme
Court decisions expanding constitutional protections. Examples include the
exclusionary rule, anti-miscegenation, same-sex sodomy, and racially
motivated peremptory challenges. 30 State supreme courts, moreover, are not
subject to the same constraints as are federal courts-including state action,
Article III justiciability limits, and the prohibition against creating positive
rights. 31
The volume and import of state supreme court decision-making is truly
awesome. At the same time, state constitutionalism remains in the shadow of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Constitution. As already noted,
academic commentary about state constitutionalism frequently has a
nationalistic cast (especially as it pertains to the penchant of leading academics
to focus on out-of-state, not in-state, consequences).3 2 And while increasing
[their] own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution," Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980), and, as
such, "a state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this
Court reads the Federal Constitution," City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S.
283, 293 (1982); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (federal courts cannot
question state court judgments in cases implicating both federal and state claims so long as
there are adequate and independent state grounds supporting the judgment).
29. In discussing this phenomenon, Robert Williams quipped: "Tallies are periodically
made and updated of the numbers of cases in which state courts have, under their own
constitutions, recognized rights beyond those [that the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes when
interpreting] the Federal Constitution. Most of us have stopped counting." Robert F.
Williams, in the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy
Problems in independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1015, 1017 (1997) (footnote omitted).
30. The nexus between state and U.S. Supreme Court rulings is discussed in James A.
Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional
Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1032-54 (2003). This practice has been
constrained in recent years-as the U.S. Supreme Court is less apt to nationalize
constitutional protections and, in so doing, borrow from the states.
31. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131 (1999) (positive rights); Hershkoff,
supra note 21 (justiciability); Robert F. Williams, Juristocracy in the American States?, 65
Mo. L. REv. 68, 72-73 (2006) (state action).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6, 12-13. In making this point, I do not mean
to denigrate the important work of many academics who have written thoughtfully about
state constitutionalism. Throughout this Article, I will cite some of this work. My point,
instead, is that state constitutionalism deserves an even higher profile, that leading law
reviews should regularly publish articles about state constitutionalism, and that the legal
academy should see state constitutional law as an important subject of curriculum and
scholarship. See infra text accompanying note 45 (discussing paucity of state constitutional
law courses); see also infra text accompanying notes 65-66 (discussing how the frequent
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recognition of the interconnection between the U.S. Supreme Court's shrinking
docket and the increasing import of state supreme court decision-making has
prompted several well done studies of the impact of judicial elections on state
supreme court decision-making and legitimacy, 33 academics are yet to explore
a range of critically important issues about the legitimacy and political
accountability of state supreme court decision-making. 34 In understanding this
gap between the obvious importance of state constitutionalism and academic
and popular press commentary, two interrelated phenomena are at play-one is
the interface between the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts; the
second concerns the dearth of courses on state constitutional law at most law
schools, especially elite law schools.
To start, state supreme court authority to independently interpret state
constitutions is, in significant respects, moored to U.S. Supreme Court
interpretations of the Federal Constitution. In particular, if the U.S. Supreme
Court expansively interprets the individual rights guarantees of the Federal
Constitution, there will be fewer opportunities for state courts to independently
interpret their constitutions. State supreme courts, for example, cannot hold that
Miranda warnings are not required under their respective constitutions.
During the "heyday of the Warren Court," the "Supreme Court took such
complete control of the field that state judges could sit back in the conviction
that their part was simply to await the next landmark decision." 35 At that time,
more than half of the Court's constitutional docket involved appeals from state
court decisions. 36 That percentage had declined to about thirty percent in the
l990s. 37 Equally significant, over time the Court-rather than follow the
amendment and replacement of state constitutions contributes to the second-class status of
state constitutionalism).
33. Politicized judicial elections are not simply about state constitutionalism, for state
supreme courts have had enormous impact through tort reform and other common law
initiatives. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts:
Legitimacy Theory and "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 59 (2008).
For additional discussion about the role of judicial elections on state court decision-making,
see infra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
34. There is next to no scholarship on voter awareness of state supreme court
decisions, on the ways in which state court justices interact with lawmakers and other
constituencies, on the likelihood that state supreme court decisions are subject to override,
and, correspondingly, on the ways in which state court justices think about potential
overrides in their decision-making. Likewise, there are only a handful of studies regarding
the legitimacy of state courts. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign
Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be
Rescued by Recusals? 6 n.7 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1491289, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1491289.
35. Robert Welsh & Ronald K.L. Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously,
CENTER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 6, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and
Lower Federal Court Interpretations ofNollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARv.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 256 n.78 (1999).
37. /d. Today, the Court hears even fewer appeals from state courts. For example, in
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Warren Court's lead by nationalizing rights-was embracing doctrinal
formulas that favored state actors. When Justice William Brennan famously
called for state courts to "be the guardians of our liberties," he was responding
to the Burger Court's increasing deference to the states and, with it, the
contraction of federal rights and remedies. 38 For Brennan, by providing
protections "extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law," state courts would "step into the breach" and
become the "font of individual liberties" that the Supreme Court had been
during the Warren Court era. 39
Starting in the 1970s, state supreme courts began to heed Justice Brennan's
call.40 "Initially, this reliance on state constitutions was occasional and largely
reactive-an attempt by a few courts to extend greater protection to individual
liberties than was available under the Burger Court interpretations . . . .' 41
Between 1977 and 1986, there were two-hundred such interpretations; by 1988,
there were four-hundred such interpretations. 42 Today, state courts throughout
the nation regularly look to their constitutions to expand civil liberty
protections-a practice that Justice Brennan called "the most important
development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.' 43 Nevertheless, state
courts are typically judged against a nationalistic benchmark-filling the
breach, rather than an independent, alternative source of constitutional
meaning. Under this view, state courts operate in the shadow of Supreme Court

2005, eleven of the Court's seventy-eight decisions involved constitutional appeals from
state court decisions (which is about fourteen percent). The Statistics, supra note 27, at 42930 tbl.3.
38. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
39. !d. at 491, 503; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1697 ("In every area where
I would like to see state constitutional rights develop, I would much prefer to see it
accomplished under the United States Constitution if possible. . . . If the goal cannot be
accomplished via the United States Constitution, then state constitutional law is a great backup plan.").
40. Frank V. Williams, III, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism
in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 591, 592 (2007).
41. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 841, 841 (1991) [hereinafter Tarr, State Constitutional Interpretation]; see also
G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS 63 (1994)
[hereinafter Tarr, New Judicial Federalism] (depicting increasing reliance on state
constitutions as new).
42. Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 7, 11-12 (1993).
43. William J. Brennan, Jr., Color-Blind, Creed-Blind, Status-Blind, Sex-Blind, 14
HUM. RTS. 30, 37 (1987); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535
( 1986) (applauding state courts that have broadly interpreted state constitutional provisions
to protect individual rights). Alan Tarr, however, saw this increasing recognition of new
constitutional rights as a paradigm shift in the development of state constitutional law. See
Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 41, at 78.
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decision-making.
The state's "poor cousin" reputation-at least among legal academics-is
also fueled by law school norms. State constitutional law is not part of the
academic culture of most American law schools, 44 especially the nation's
leading law schools. In the 2007-2008 academic year, no school ranked in the
top fifteen offered such a course, and only one of the top twenty law schools
offered a course in state constitutionallaw. 45
B. A Quick Tour of State Constitutions

The origins and content of state constitutions are highly varied and
complex, emerging from a "jagged history of state political development and
constitution-formation over the lifespan of the American republic.'.4 6 At the
same time, there is a great deal of overlap in state constitutions. For example,
knowing that Congress would have to approve their constitutions, lateradmitted states would borrow from earlier state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution.47 Indeed, as Lawrence Friedman observed, "States sometimes
copied material blindly. It is hard to imagine, for example, that Iowa in 1857
really needed a clause on quartering of soldiers in private homes in time of
peace.'.4 8 For the balance of this Part, I will provide a quick tour of similarities

44. There are notable exceptions. Starting in 1988, the Rutgers Law Journal has
published an annual symposium on state constitutionalism. See Robert F. Williams & Earl
M. Maltz, Introduction, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 877, 878 (1989) (announcing that the 1988 Rutgers
symposium would be the "first in an annual series of Rutgers Law Journal issues on state
constitutional law").
45. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach-and Why Study-State Constitutional Law, 34
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 165, 166-67 (2009); see also Lawrence Friedman & Charles H.
Baron, Baker v. State and the Promise of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 125,
156-57 (2001) (encouraging law schools to expand offerings in state constitutional law).
When looking at all law schools, approximately twenty-five of the nation's two-hundred law
schools offer a survey course in state constitutional law and another seventeen offer a statespecific version of the course. See Sutton, supra, at 166 (the calculations of twenty-five and
seventeen are based on averaging the numbers cited by Judge Sutton). On February 4, 2010,
the Conference of Chief Justices of state supreme courts approved a resolution both noting
that state constitutionalism is not explored in "the overwhelming majority" of constitutional
law courses and "encourag(ing] all law schools to offer a course on state constitutional law."
Conference of Chief Justices Resolution 1 (Feb. 4, 2010) (on file with author).
46. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Scope of Judicial Review, in
DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITIJTIONAL NORMS (Jim Gardner & Jim Rossi eds.,
forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with author).
47. Similarities among state constitutions are also tied to the need for "the framers of a
state constitution (to] operate within the context defined by the United States Constitution:
thus, they must write a document that is appropriate to the federal system created by that
national document." Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12
PUBLIUS 27,27 (1982).
48. Lawrence Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 33, 37 (1988); see also James A. Gardner, Southern Character,
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in
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and differences among state constitutions.
In so doing, I will make three principal points that will lay the foundation
for Parts II and III of this Article. First, state constitutions are fundamentally
different than the Federal Constitution. Second, state constitutions can be
dramatically different from each other. Some constitutions, particularly early
constitutions, look very much like the Federal Constitution; other constitutions
seem less majestic-with provisions that seem more like a detailed statute than
a statement of higher law. Third, notwithstanding these differences, it is
undoubtedly true that state constitutions borrow from each other and from the
Federal Constitution.
1. The scope, length, and method of revising state constitutions

State constitutions vary dramatically in their methods of revision and in
their inclusion of so-called super-legislation; that is, provisions that look like
ordinary statutes but have, for some political reason, "been upgraded from the
statute books to constitutional status.'A9 The question of how regional identity
and history figure into the look of state constitutions will be explored later in
this Part. At this point, I want to highlight some basic differences between the
U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of most (but not all) states.
To start, state constitutions are much more malleable than the U.S.
Constitution. Only one of the founding states (Massachusetts) has its original
constitution; more than thirty states have had multiple constitutions; and most
states have adopted three or more constitutions (with Louisiana having adopted
eleven). 50 States have held 233 constitutional conventions, and have
collectively adopted 147 different constitutions and more than 7,000
constitutional amendments (with Alabama having amended its constitution
more than 800 times). 51 Over the past thirty years, however, only one state

Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1219, 1228 (1998) (arguing that state constitutions
are not unique in important respects, and highlighting how even Confederate states "viewed
their constitutions as ... parallel instantiations of a set of universal constitutional principles
common to all American constitutions").
49. Friedman, supra note 48, at 36.
50. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 23 7, 248-49 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
51. See JOHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 8-11 (2006)
(discussing the number of conventions and dramatic differences among states-with some
holding only one and others holding as many as ten or more); THE BooK OF THE STATES
2009 12 tb\.1.1 (2009); Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177, 180, 192-94 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (noting the number of constitutions as well as dramatic
differences among states in ways that conventions are structured and how broad or limited
the conventions' powers are); G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra, at 1, 2 (noting the number of amendments). For a quick
general overview, see Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections
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(Georgia) has adopted a new constitution and two-thirds of all states have
constitutions that are more than a hundred years old. 52 In other words, the
principal mechanism by which states now update their constitutions is the
amendment process-initiated either through the state legislature or through
voters in one of the twenty-four states that allow for some kind of directdemocracy measures.53 There is significant variance among states in the
requirements both of legislature and voter-initiated constitutional
amendments.54 For example, before sending legislature-proposed constitutional
amendments to the voters for ratification, eleven states require the
consideration of constitutional proposals in two separate legislative sessions
and twenty-seven states impose some type of supermajority vote by the state
legislature. 55 Voter ratification rules also vary, with seven states requiring
something other than a simple majority vote.56 There is also significant
variation among direct-democracy states concerning the procedures to get an
initiative on the ballot. 57 Furthermore, some states place subject matter
restrictions and super-majority voting requirements along with other procedural
requirements that restrict the use of the initiative process. 5 8
Differences between the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions abound.
With most states having three different constitutions and more than a hundred
constitutional amendments, state constitutions tend to be much more detailoriented than the Federal Constitution. In fact, state constitutions are, on
average, nearly four times longer than the Federal Constitution, and some state

on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REv. 1517, 1519-22 (2009).
52 . ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (2d ed.
2006); Cain & Noll, supra note 51, at 1520 (citing Benjamin, supra note 51 , at 196; Tarr,
supra note 51 , at 3); see also Robert F. Williams, Should the Oregon Constitution Be
Revised, and If So, How Should It Be Accomplished?, 87 OR. L. REv. 867, 901 (2008)
(acknowledging that, since 1960, "conventions seem to have lost their legitimacy in the
public mind").
53. DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS
OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 25 (2004).
54. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 38-39 (1984). In Parts II and III of this Article I will talk more about
how differences in amendment schemes impact state court decision-making.
55. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 51, at 14 tbl.l.2. Twenty-seven states
require either a three-fifths (nine states) or two-thirds (eighteen states) vote; four states
(Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont) make use of hybrid schemes involving
both majority and super-majority votes. Jd. Three of the twenty-nine states with supermajority requirements (Connecticut, Hawaii, and New Jersey) also allow for a majority vote
in two successive sessions. Jd.
56. /d. at 16.
57. For a listing of requirements to get a constitutional initiative on the ballot and
passed, see id. at 16 tbl.l.3. Of particular note, eighteen states have an initial signature
requirement based on some percentage (ranging from three to fifteen percent) of votes for
governor or all candidates for governor in the last election. See id.
58. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 36-37 (2009).
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Constitutions are close to ten times as long as the U.S. Constitution. 59 The
Alabama Constitution, for example, is close to 350,000 words long, with
hundreds of amendments. 60 And while Alabama is an extreme case, state
constitutions cover a broader range of subjects and provide greater details of
what the government can and cannot do than does the Federal Constitution. 61
State constitutions often look like super legislation, "not sacred texts.'.6 2
For those who think the Federal "Constitution is the standard by which we
understand and judge other constitutions,"63 the specificity--even silliness--of
some state constitutional provisions is cause for alarm and disdain. Examples
include the Arkansas Constitution (which "devotes an entire article to railroads,
canals, and turnpikes"), the Idaho Constitution (which "devotes one to
livestock"), the New York Constitution ("specifying the width of ski trails in
the Adirondack Park"), the California Constitution (identifying "which taxes
are to be assessed on golf courses"), the Texas Constitution (allowing for the
use of unmanned teller machines at banks), and the Tennessee Constitution
(which, in 1796, "fixed the governor's salary at $750"). 64
"This apparently haphazard lumping together of the fundamental and the
prosaic in a single document," Alan Tarr observed, "has prevented many
scholars from taking state constitutions seriously."65 Judge Wilkinson, for
example, minced no words when complaining about the frequency with which
states amend constitutions and, correspondingly, the degree of detail in many
state constitutions. He insists that the inclusion of "essentially statutory
provisions" in state constitutions "risk[s] trivializing them" and that states need
to operate within the framework of "American constitutionalism" and, in so
doing, to recognize that constitutions, unlike statutes, are "articulations of
fundamental rather than positive law."66 Whatever one thinks of the normative
desirability of a broadly framed or highly specific constitution, 67 Judge
59. Albert L. Sturm, The Development ofAmerican State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57,
74 & n.57 (1982).
60. H. Bailey Thomson, Constitutional Reform in Alabama: A Long Time in Coming,
in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 51, at 113, 114.
61. Gardner, supra note 23, at 818-19.
62. Friedman, supra note 48, at 35.
63. Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: AntiFederalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74,
74 (1989). Professor Rose was not embracing this view; she was criticizing it.
64. Friedman, supra note 48, at 36 (Tennessee); Gardner, supra note 23, at 819 (New
York, California, Texas); Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 572 (Arkansas and Idaho).
65. G. ALAN T ARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2 (1998).
66. Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 574.
67. The question of whether it is normatively desirable for state constitutions to be as
lengthy as they are is beyond the scope of this paper. Some commentators caution that the
practice of some states to load their constitutions up with more and more amendments comes
at a cost. See Cain & Noll, supra note 51, at 1542-43 (noting that "the cumulative effects of
separately adopted policy initiatives [through the amendment process] can substantially alter
a state government's powers and capacities in ways that might not be foreseen by voters
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Wilkinson's claim that the lodestar of American constitutionalism is a broadly
framed minimalist document is incorrect. The lack of detail in the U.S.
Constitution speaks more to constitutionalism at a moment in time (when
constitutional drafters understood constitutions to be "great outlines" that avoid
legislation-like specifics)68 than it does to American constitutionalism (which
recognizes significant state autonomy in the crafting of its constitution). 69
On this point, I think it useful to highlight the time-bound quality of
various mechanisms by which state constitutions can be reinvented, either
through a constitutional convention or through legislative or voter-initiated
amendments. Most of the original revolutionary-era state constitutions imposed
severe limits on constitutional amendments-requiring votes from consecutive
legislative sessions, requiring super-majority votes, or specifying that
amendments could be introduced through constitutional conventions only. 70
During the twentieth century, constitutional amendments became the principal
vehicle for constitutional change. 71 One of the principal drives in this shift
towards constitutional amendments were Progressive era (1890s through
1920s) efforts to both push for the approval of direct-democracy measures and
pursue a range of economic, political, and social reforms by amending state
constitutions. 72 From 1898 to 1918, twenty states had amended their
constitutions to allow for voter initiatives. 73
when each particular measure is passed"). On the other hand, it is also possible that "state
constitutions should contain more institutions and policy content' and, in so doing, become
an "important mechanism of state government [operations]." Christopher W. Hammons,
State Constitutional Reform: Is it Necessary?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 1327, 1343, 1345 (2001); see
also Christopher W. Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American
Preference for Short Framework-Oriented Constitutions, 93 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 837 (1999)
(arguing that the "relationship among content, length, and durability" in state constitutions
"refutes the assumption that the design of the national constitution is necessarily superior").
68. See Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited:
Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth Century West, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 945, 964-65 (1994) (discussing practices of early state constitution drafters and
contrasting their values to the values of the drafters of the 1849 California Constitution); id.
at 958 (quoting McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
69. The U.S. Constitution does not even mandate that states have constitutions, let
alone dictate the degree of detail or generality in state constitutions.
70. See DINAN, supra note 51, at 42-47.
71. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 52, at 902 (noting that, in the states in which they
are permitted, voter initiatives are generally perceived as more legitimate than conventions);
see also Cain & Noll, supra note 51, at 1520, 1523 (highlighting both recent trends and
calling attention to the comparative ease of amending state constitutions).
72. See STEVEN L. PlOTT, GNING VOTERS A VOICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 1-2 (2003) (tracing the origins of the national debate on voter
initiatives). For an excellent treatment of the acrimonious relationship between progressives
and state courts, see WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994). Progressives also pursued social
change by pushing for reforms through legislature-initiated constitutional amendments.
73. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIAffi'E, PUBLIC
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The fact that states often act in tandem is hardly surprising. State
constitutionalism reflects larger social and political forces throughout the
nation. At the same time, state practices are extremely varied. The rise of direct
democracy was at once a nationwide phenomenon, but also a phenomenon that
took hold in only half the states (and at two different moments in time). 74
Moreover, the ease with which state constitutions can be modified suggests that
the dynamic between state supreme courts, state officials, and voters is
fundamentally different than the constitutional dialogues which take place
between the U.S. Supreme Court, elected officials, and voters over the meaning
of the U.S. Constitution. 75
2. Judicial selection and retention

Judicial selection and retention also highlights differences between state
and federal systems and among state systems, related differences in the political
accountability of state supreme court justices, and the role of historical trends
in establishing state practices. Table 1 details some of the differences between
state systems over time, charting both the rise of judicial elections and the
presence of numerous appointment and retention schemes. 76 In addition to
these differences, there are dramatic differences in the terms of office among
state supreme court justices. Most justices serve specified terms (three, four,
six, eight, ten, twelve years), although some states specify either mandatory
retirement ages or life tenure. 77 Some states, moreover, make use of judicial
selection commissions (either to formally reappoint or assess performances) or
ask incumbent justices to formally reapply to either the governor or some
nominating commission. 78 There are other differences as well.1 9

POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2004). A second wave of direct democracy reforms
were pursued in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reflecting the dramatic increase in
government distrust. See MAGLEBY, supra note 54, at 15. Twenty-three of the twenty-four
states that allow for voter initiatives approved such initiatives in one of these two periods.
74. It is also noteworthy that most direct democracy states are west of the Mississippi
River. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see MILLER, supra note 58, at 37. See also
infra notes 111, 134 (discussing whether regional differences contribute to different state
constitutional structures).
75. For additional discussion, see infra notes 203-05, 254-66.
76. For a somewhat similar table, see F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial
Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431,435 (2004).
See also DAVID B. ROTIMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 2004, at 25-27 tb1.4 (2004) (listing the ways in which each state selects its
state supreme court justices).
77. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2009). The most common term lengths after an initial
election are six years (ten states), eight years (six states), ten years (four states), and twelve
years (one state).Jd.
78. !d.
79. Some states, for example, have shorter initial terms followed by longer terms or
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Table 1: Judicial Appointment and Retention Schemes
Retention Method State
Retention
Election

Current Appointment
Method (year switched)

Original Method (year
joined the union)

Pennsylvania

Partisan ( 1850)

Leg. (1787)

Maryland

Merit plan (1976)

Indiana

Merit plan (1968)

Illinois

Partisan (1971)

Missouri

Merit plan (1940)

Florida

Merit plan (1972)

Iowa

Merit plan (1962)

California

Gov. (1934)

Kansas

Merit plan (1958)

Nebraska

Merit plan (1962)

Colorado

Merit plan (1966)

South Dakota

Merit plan (1981)

Wyoming

Merit plan (1973)

80

Gov. (1788)

81

Gov. (1816)

82

Leg. (1818)
83

Gov. (1821)

84

Leg. (1845)

85

Leg. (1846)

86

Partisan (1850)
Partisan (1861)
87

Partisan (1867)
Partisan (1876)

88

Partisan (1889)

89

Partisan (1890)

Utah

Merit plan (1967r

Partisan (1896)

Oklahoma

Merit plan (1967)

Partisan ( 1907)

Arizona

Merit plan (1974)

Nonpartisan (1912)

make use of special commissions to approve gubernatorial nominations. /d.
80. Maryland switched to partisan elections in 1851 and then nonpartisan elections in
1952. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l.
81. Indiana switched to partisan elections in 1851. !d.
82. Illinois switched to partisan elections in 1848. /d.
83. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 25(c)(1). Missouri switched to partisan elections in 1850.
Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l.
84. Florida switched to partisan elections in 1887. /d.
85. Iowa switched to partisan elections in 1857. /d.
86. California switched to nonpartisan elections in 1911. /d.
87. Nebraska switched to nonpartisan elections in 1913. /d.
88. South Dakota switched to nonpartisan elections in 1916. /d.
89. Wyoming switched to nonpartisan elections in 1915. /d.
90. Utah switched to nonpartisan elections in 1952. /d.
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Gov. w/ comm'n. (1989)

Partisan (1912)

Merit plan

Merit plan ( 1959)
92

Leg. (1788)

Georgia

Nonpartisan (1984)

North Carolina

Nonpartisan (2002)

93

Leg. (1789)

Kentucky

4
Nonpartisan ( 1968l

Gov. (1792)

Tennessee

Gov. w/ comm'n. (1971)

Ohio

Nonpartisan (1911)

Mississippi

Nonpartisan (1994)

Arkansas

Nonpartisan (2000)

Michigan

Nonpartisan (1943)

Wisconsin

Nonpartisan (1914)

Partisan ( 1848)

Minnesota

Nonpartisan (1912)

Partisan (1958)

Oregon

Nonpartisan (1932)

Partisan ( 1859)

Nevada

Nonpartisan (1915)

Partisan (1864)

Montana

Nonpartisan (1935)

Partisan ( 1889)

North Dakota

Nonpartisan (1910)

Partisan (1889)

95

Leg. (1976)

96

Leg. (1803)

97

Leg. (1817)

98

Leg. (1836)

99

Gov. (1837)

91. Once appointed, a judge must run in the next partisan election and, thereafter, be
subject to retention or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 35.
92. Georgia switched to partisan elections in 1896. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43
tbl.l.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 163-322 (2009). North Carolina switched to partisan elections in
1868. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l.
94. Kentucky switched to partisan elections in 1850. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43
tbl.l.
95. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 17-4-112 (2009). Tennessee switched to partisan elections in
1853 and nonpartisan elections in 1952. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l. It first did
away with partisan elections in favor of retention elections in 1971. Supreme court justices
were removed from the plan in 1974 but added back in 1994. BrianT. Fitzpatrick, Election
As Appointment: The Tennessee Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REv. 473, 481 (2008).
96. Ohio switched to partisan elections in 1851. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43
tbl.l.
97. See Lenore L. Prather, Judicial Selection: What Is Right for Mississippi?, 21 MISS.
C. L. REv. 199, 204 (2002). Mississippi switched to governor appointment in 1868 and
partisan elections in 1914. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l.
98. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-10-102 (2010). Arkansas switched to partisan elections in
1874. See Hanssen, supra note 76, at 442-43 tbl.l.
99. Michigan switched to partisan elections in 1850. See Hanssen, supra note 76, at
442-43 tbl.1.
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Governor

Legislative
Election

Legislative
Appointment
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Nominating
Committee
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Washington

Nonpartisan (I 912)

Partisan (1889)

Idaho

Nonpartisan ( 1935)

Partisan ( 1890)

Louisiana

Partisan (I 904)

Alabama

Partisan (I 867)

Leg. (1819)

Texas

Partisan (I 876)

Gov. (1845)

West Virginia

Partisan

Partisan ( 1863)

Delaware

Gov. w/ leg. consent (I 989)

Gov. (1787)

New York

Gov. w/ comm'n. (1978)

101

Gov. (1788)

Maine

Gov.

Gov. (1820)

South Carolina

Leg.

Leg. (1788)

Vermont

Gov. w/ comm'n. (1984)

Leg. (I 791)

Connecticut

Gov. w/ comm' n. (1987) 102

Leg. (1788)

Virginia

Leg.

Leg. (1788)

Hawaii

Merit plan

Merit plan (1959)

Gov.

Gov. (1787)

New Hampshire Gov.

Gov. (1788)

Massachusetts

Gov.

Gov. (1788)

Rhode Island

Leg. w/ comm'n.

Leg. (1790)

Judges serve until New Jerseyl03
age 70

Life Tenure

1647

100

Gov. (1812)

Key : Gov.=appointment by governor; Gov. w/ comm 'n.=appointment by governor from Jist
assembled by a nominating commission; Leg.=appointment by legislature; Merit plan=merit
plan appointment; Nonpartisan=nonpartisan election; Partisan=partisan election
Note: In some cases of governor with commission, the legislature does the actual appointment
of the person chosen by the governor from the names provided to him by the commission.

100. LA. CONST. art. V, §4; Am . Judicature Soc'y, Judicial Selection in the States,
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selectionlindex.cfm?state=LA (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
101. New York switched to partisan elections in 1847. See Hanssen, supra note 76, at
442-43 tbl.l.
102. Connecticut switched to governor appointment in 1952. /d.
103 . In New Jersey, justices serve an initial term of seven years. The governor then
chooses whether to nominate them for tenure. If he does, and the nomination is confirmed by
the senate, the justice may serve until age seventy with no additional retention requirements.
N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
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Notwithstanding important differences among states, judicial selection and
retention procedures often track larger historical trends. 104 Before 1832, all
states made use of either legislative appointments, gubernatorial appointments,
or shared legislative-gubernatorial appointments. 105 From 1846 to 1912, every
state that entered the union made use of some type of electoral scheme (and
106
Finally,
some states switched from judicial appointments to elections).
starting around the early 1900s, bar organizations pushed for so-called merit
plans-so that initial nominations would run through a nominating commission
and retention decisions would be made through retention election (where the
sitting justice runs unopposed, and will retain her seat unless a majority of
voters oppose the retention). 107 From 1940 to 1989, twenty states embraced
some version of the merit plan. 108
Today, judicial elections figure into the appointment or retention of
supreme court justices in thirty-eight states (around half of which are contested
elections), and only one state constitution (Rhode Island) provides for life
tenure. 109 Needless to say, state supreme court justices are accountable to
voters and political parties in ways that federal court judges would find
unimaginable. 110 This is especially true in southern states, where partisan

104. For an analysis of why some but not other states responded to these trends, see
generally Hanssen, supra note 76. See also Lee Epstein et al., Selecting Selection Systems, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 192 (S.B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds.,
2002) (arguing that the design of judicial selection systems is tied to the political objectives
oflawmakers).
105. Rather than support judicial independence, however, the first state constitutions
"put state courts very much under the thumb of state legislatures," specifying some
legislative role in the appointment of judges and granting legislatures substantial power to
reappoint or remove judges. Hanssen, supra note 76, at 441-45; see also Steven P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv.
689, 714 (1995).
106. Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum American, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190 (1993). Nelson
provides a useful history of judicial selection systems in early America. See also Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial
Review, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (2010) (noting that rise of judicial elections from
1844 to 1853 was intended to facilitate countermajoritarian judicial review of state
practices).
107. See Hanssen, supra note 76, at 451-53.
108. /d. at 456.
109. See AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 77, at 4-11; see also tbl.l (detailing
retention schemes in all 50 states). Indeed, roughly ninety percent of state judges face some
type of popular election. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial
Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 app. 2 (2007); Shugerman, supra note 105, at 1063. On
the ever-increasing trend for state judicial elections to be contested, see infra notes 165-81
and accompanying text.
110. It is also noteworthy that-in non-election states-appointed judges interested in
legislative or gubernatorial reappointment also have incentive to act strategically (and, as
such, take into account partisan factors associated with winning reappointment). See Joanna
M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1589 (2009).
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elections still dominate. 111 In Part II, I will consider the ramifications of all
this, focusing both on whether state justices should take election/reappointment
risks into account and which election/reappointment schemes, in fact, pose
meaningful risks.
3. The docket of state supreme courts
State supreme courts have no choice but to actively participate in the policy
process. Unlike federal courts, state courts are constrained in their ability to
make use of the so-called "passive virtues," that is, the use of state action
limitations, justiciability barriers, and (for the Supreme Court) certiorari denials
to steer clear of politically divisive issues. 112 Unlike federal courts, moreover,
state courts are common law courts and, as such, have policy-making
jurisdiction over a wide range of subjects. 113 Consequently, although most state
supreme courts retain substantial discretion over which cases to hear, 114 state
courts have fewer tools available to extricate themselves from the political
thicket. Correspondingly, state courts have greater opportunities to play an
activist role in shaping state policymaking-a fact not lost on interest groups
whose campaign contributions and lobbying efforts impact judicial elections
and some reappointment schemes. 115
State practices vary considerably, especially with respect to state supreme

Ill. On regional differences, see Herny R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection
Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70
JUDICATURE 228, 230 (1987); Hanssen, supra note 76, at 453-57. In addition to regional
differences, state selection systems also track differences both between agricultural and
industrial states and between densely populated and rural states. See Victor Eugene Flango &
Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?: Selection
Procedures in State Courts ofLast Resort, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25, 37-39 (1979).
112. The classic defense of this practice can be found in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986). For a discussion of the "passive virtues" and state
courts, see Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall, & Laura Langer, Judicial Choice and the Politics
of Abortion: Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1265
(1999); Hershkoff, supra note 21; see also Helen Hershkoff, State Common Law and the
Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
NORMS, supra note 46 (noting state court practices of extending constitutional rights to the
private sector).
113. See Hans Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 215
(1992); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1256 (1978).
114. For an excellent (albeit slightly dated) overview of state court caseload, including
state supreme court control over their dockets, see Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of
State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978). For additional discussion, see infra
notes 116-21.
115. See Gibson, supra note 33 (linking increasing politicization of judicial election to
state supreme court policymaking); Michael Solimine & Rafael Gely, Federal and State
Judicial Selection in an Interest Group Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REv. 531 (2009). For a
defense of state court recognition of positive rights, see Hershkoff, supra note 31.
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court authority to hear cases through grants of certiorari or to sua sponte
remove a case from a lower state court. 116 The rule of thumb is that mediumsized and larger states with intermediate appeals courts have significant
discretion to select cases for review; low-population states with no lower
appeals courts have no discretion. 117 There are, however, a gazillion exceptions
to this rule of thumb--so that substantial discretion is a far cry from the near
plenary discretion that the U.S. Supreme Court has over which cases it will
hear. Moreover, some state courts have the power to intervene in cases before
there is a formal appeal. Consider, for example, state supreme court decisions
establishing rights to same-sex marriage or civil unions. In Vermont, there is no
intermediate appeals court and, consequently, the state supreme court had no
choice but to hear the appeal; in New Jersey and Iowa, the state supreme courts
are obligated to consider constitutional challenges to state law and 118
consequently, had no choice but to hear the appeals (although the Iowa
Supreme Court has authority to hear appeals directly from a trial court-which
they did in this case); 119 in Hawaii, California, and Massachusetts, the state
supreme courts granted certiorari (although, in Massachusetts, the Court acted
on a request for a direct review of a trial court decision); in Connecticut, the
state supreme court sua sponte transferred the appeal from the appellate court to
itself. 120
State practices in same-sex marriage cases make clear that state supreme
court discretion to use certiorari denials is highly variable, as is the power of
state supreme courts to bypass intermediate courts of appeals. For courts that
must hear all appeals and courts that cannot tum down constitutional challenges

116. The Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State Courts runs a useful
website which identifies the mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction of each state supreme
See
Nat'!
Ctr.
for
State
Courts,
Court
Statistics
Project
court.
.ncsconline.org/0_ Research/Ct_Structllndex.html (last visited May 1, 201 0). This website
reveals considerable variations among states. It also reveals that many states have Byzantine
systems-whereby, for example, some but not all civil and criminal cases are subject to
either mandatory or discretionary review.
117. See Kagan, supra note 114, at 984-85. It is also noteworthy that the interest
groups-most notably the American Judicature Society and American Bar Association-that
pushed for merit selection/retention plans also pushed for state supreme court control over
their dockets. Jd. at 980-81. During the height of the Warren Court (the early 1960s), these
interest groups "helped build a reform-minded climate of opinion," spurring state lawmakers
to approve of increasing supreme court discretion and, with it, emboldening state supreme
courts to use docket control to identify cases that would allow them to speak more broadly
about important legal questions. See id. at 981-84.
118. N.J. CONST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2.
119. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 602.4102 (West 2010).
120. See IOWA CODE § 602.4102 (2009); VT. STATE. ANN. tit. 4, § 2 (2009); in re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 405 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407,415 n.ll (Conn. 2008); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,951 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,
205 (N.J. 2006). For additional discussion, see infra note 267.
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to state laws, there was no opportunity to opt out of this political thicket. 121
State courts, moreover, "undertake a wider range of functions than do federal
courts in terms of advice-giving, administration, and policy-making." 122 The
constitutions of eight states and statutes in three others authorize governors or
legislators to seek advisory opinions (with some permitting and others
mandating issuance, subject, of course, to a range of state-specific
requirements). 123 And while some state courts adhere to U.S. Supreme Court
justiciability doctrine, several states veer from it in one or another respect. 124
For example, state courts frequently entertain "disputes between state or local
officials when federal courts would dismiss comparable cases for lack of
'standing' or 'ripeness."' 125 Likewise, lawmakers may challenge gubernatorial
vetoes and, more generally, state courts often resolve disputes between
lawmakers and executive officials. 126
State courts, moreover, are not always bound by state action limitations
and, more generally, state courts play an active policymaking role in ways that
would be unimaginable for federal courts. Some state courts adhere to U.S.
Supreme Court norms governing state action and others do not-reflecting, in
part, variations in state constitutions themselves (some but not all of which
contain state action limitations). 127 More fundamentally, "while federal
constitutional law is cabined by the text of the Constitution, state courts move
seamlessly between the common law and state constitutional law, the shifting
121. Another variation in state court practices is intended to limit judicial review of
state government decision-making, namely, the requirement (now valid in only North
Dakota and Nebraska) that a super-majority of justices support the exercise of judicial
review. See John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Constitutional Amendments and the
State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 985-86 (2007). For additional
discussion of state supreme court jurisdiction (including the obligation of many state courts
to hear constitutional challenges), see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal.
Dissent, and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source,
89 B.U. L. REv. 1451, 1457 (2009).
122. Hershkoff, supra note 21, at 1841.
123. !d. at 1845-46; Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process
in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 254-56 (1997) (noting, for example,
that some states mandate advisory opinions only on death penalty issues, some mandate
advisory opinions on constitutional issues, and some specify that the constitutional question
affect the duties of the requesting authority).
124. See Topf, supra note 123, at 254-56.
125. Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La
Difference!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2005); see also Christine M. Durham, The
Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1601, 1605 (2001) (noting that several state constitutions contain provisions
specifically providing for judicial review oflegislative and gubernatorial action).
126. See Linde, supra note 125, at 1275. Several state courts often depart from the
federal court model when deciding whether a dispute is moot or whether a case presents
political questions. See Hershkoff, supra note 21, at 1859-67.
127. See John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on
State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J.
819,822-23 (1990).
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ground at times barely perceptible." 128 For example, state courts are sometimes
called upon to adapt constitutional norms in nongovernmental settings. Private
and public law may overlap (as in, for example, tort actions grounded in
privacy rights or free speech protections that may limit the rights of property
owners) so that state courts elaborate on constitutional values in exercising
their common law powers. 129
State court policymaking is also fueled by state constitutional provisions
providing for positive rights. Twelve state constitutions guarantee welfare
rights, and other state constitutions include affirmative rights to education and
just compensation. 130 And while state courts are reluctant to expansively
interpret such provisions, 131 the existence of litigation over their reach places
state courts in the middle of highly contested policy disputes. Furthermore,
"[c]ontrary to the limited, interstitial role played by the federal courts," state
courts often serve as "principal lawgivers within their jurisdictions through the
evolution and application of the common law." 132 State judges, for example,
set policy in highly charged fields like tort law. 133
4. The state character of state constitutions

Up to this point, I have focused my attention on differences between state
constitutions and the Federal Constitution and the varied character of state
constitutions. In so doing, I have called attention to the need for state supreme
courts to see their constitutional schemes as fundamentally different from the
federal system and from each other. To a much lesser extent, I have suggested
that, notwithstanding these variances, there is a great deal that state
constitutions share both with each other and the Federal Constitution. For
example, there are significant regional differences: direct democracy states are
concentrated in the West; contested elections typically take place in the South
and Midwest; and minimalist constitutions that largely follow the federal model

128. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15 (1995) (footnote omitted).
129. For a discussion of these examples and their broader ramifications, see Hershkoff,
supra note 21.
130. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1135. Indeed, as Helen Hershkoff notes in her
contribution to this Symposium, "every state constitution . . . contains some explicit
commitment to positive rights." Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words": Common Law and the
Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1521,
1523 (2010).
131. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1182 (identifying state protections of positive
rights and expressing disappointment in the failure of state courts to give significant
independent meaning to positive rights).
132. Sager, supra note 113, at 1256.
133. See Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?,
28 VAL. U. L. REv. 821 (1994); see also Kaye, supra note 128, at 7 (noting some common
law powers of state courts).
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are typically in New England. 134 Also, state constitution writing is very much
tied to historical moments; for example, New England constitutions resemble
the Federal Constitution because they were written around the same time, and
constitution writing during the Progressive era reflected Progressive values. 135
For the balance of this Part, I want to connect these dots in ways that will frame
the rest of this Article. In particular, I want to highlight why I think that state
supreme courts can learn from each other while, at the same time, maintaining
their autonomy as independent sovereigns with somewhat competing
constitutional traditions.
Let me start by distinguishing my project from the extant literature on state
constitutionalism, particularly the divide over whether state constitutions are
meaningfully tied to a state's character or tradition. Those who see state
constitutionalism as a distinctive enterprise, most notably state supreme court
justices, embrace "the diversity that federalism allows," emphasize that states
"espouse cultural values distinctively their own," and call attention to "the vast
differences in culture, politics, experience, education, and economic status"
between states and the framers of the U.S. Constitution. 136 Critics of this view,
while recognizing basic differences among state constitutional texts, argue that
state constitutions do not reflect a particular state's character and that, in fact,
we merely have fifty highly varied and almost random collections of
constitutional provisions. 137 More than that, critics contend that the best
explanation for varying state practices is the simple fact that state constitutions

134. See Miller, supra note 58, at 37 (showing that all western states are direct
democracy states and that nearly all direct democracy states are west of the Mississippi
River); supra tbl.l (highlighting judicial selection systems, including the prevalence of
contested elections in the South and Midwest); supra notes 68-70 (discussing revolutionaryera state constitutions, many of which were in New England); see also Patrick Baude,
Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 839-44 (1997)
(tracking regional patterns among state constitutional provisions and state supreme court
references to other state practices).
135. See supra notes 70-73 .
136. Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law,
1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17, 19 ( 1988); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in
Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399, 423 (1987); Hans A. Linde, State
Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 927,932 (1993); Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:
Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239, 244 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985);
see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L. J. 951,966 (1982)
(arguing that "differences in our state constitutions are not accidents of draftsmanship . . .
[but rather] reflect differences in our traditions").
137. The most prominent critic of state-based constitutionalism is Jim Gardner, whose
work has prompted some of the defenses of state-based constitutionalism cited above. Two
exemplary pieces are Gardner, supra note 23 and Gardner, supra note 30. Critiques of
Gardner include Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HAR.v. L. REv. 1147, 1160-63 (1993) and Linde, supra note 136. For additional commentary
on Gardner, see Fifth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (1993).
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were written at different moments in time and, as such, varying state practices
have a nationalistic cast, reflecting political trends that cut across all states. 138
For reasons I will now explain, there is a way to simultaneously embrace
the seemingly competing ideas that state constitutions are both reflections of
larger national political moments and fundamentally distinctive. This can be
done by shifting the focus of the inquiry away from the methodological
question of how best to interpret state constitutions and towards the
implementation of a state court's preferred doctrine. In doing so, the debate
over whether state constitutionalism is truly distinctive gives way to obvious
differences in state constitutional structures. For state supreme court justices
who care about the consequences of their decisions (whether personal
consequences like reelection or policy consequences concerning the
implementation of their rulings), these differences in state systems are hugely
important. At the same time, just as states look to each other and to larger
national trends in sorting out the details of their constitutional systems, state
supreme court justices can look to the experiences of other states in assessing
these consequences. On high-salience issues like the death penalty, same-sex
marriage, and the restructuring of school finance, for example, the experiences
of one state may inform another state supreme court of potential
implementation or backlash risks. 139
By calling attention to how state constitutional systems are both different
from each other and connected to national trends, this Part lays the groundwork
for a state-centered approach to state constitutionalism which, at the same time,
takes into account the experiences of other states and larger national trends.
Parts II and III of this Article will carry this theme forward. In Part II, I will
discuss whether state supreme courts have the capacity to assess consequences
and identify which consequences state supreme court justices might deem
relevant to their decision-making. In Part III, I will make the lessons of Part II
more concrete, focusing on the on-the-ground facts of same-sex marriage.

II. Do STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES TAKE CONSEQUENCES INTO
ACCOUNT?

State supreme court rulings sometimes trigger a backlash comprised of
"[i]ntense and sustained public disapproval[] accompanied by aggressive steps
to resist that ruling and to remove its legal force." 140 That backlash might occur

138. This claim is widely shared. See Friedman, supra note 48; Nelson, supra note
I 06; Rodriguez, supra note 46; see also Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in
State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389 ( 1998) (noting the fluidity of state
constitutions and, in doing so, rejecting the idea that state constitutions reflect a distinctive
state culture).
139. Parts II and lii will provide additional details of the political dynamics
surrounding state supreme court decision-making.
140. Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash's Travels, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435, 435
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within the state (for example, in the nullification of state supreme court
recognition of same-sex marriage in Hawaii and California, and the ouster of
state supreme court justices who voted against the death penalty in California
and Tennessee). 141 That backlash might occur in other states or even in the
federal government (as in the nation-wide campaign against same-sex marriage
that followed the rulings ofthe Hawaii and Massachusetts Supreme Courts). 142
Two questions remain: (1) Do state justices attend to public outrage?; and (2)
Do they have the capacity to assess either in-state or nationwide consequences?
In answering these questions, we must pay attention to the ways in which state
constitutional systems allow voters and/or elected officials to resist state court
rulings, the capacity of state supreme court justices to assess consequences, and
the views of state supreme court justices on which, if any, consequences
warrant their engagement in strategic behavior (instead of simply their votes for
their preferred legal policy positions).
This Part will address these issues and, in doing so, provide a preliminary
answer to the question of whether state courts take consequences into
account. 143 In doing so, I will argue that both backlash risks and the capacity of
state justices to assess in-state consequences vary dramatically from state to
state-thus reflecting dramatic differences in state constitutional systems. At
the same time, justices in most states have the incentive and capacity to take
into account in-state backlash risks. With respect to out-of-state backlash,
however, state supreme court justices do not have the capacity to assess
backlash risks across the nation. Further complicating matters, different justices
will value different consequences in varying ways-some but not others will
care about national backlash; some but not others will care about a
constitutional amendment nullifying their ruling; and some but not others will
care about their reputation with state officials; academic and media elites; and
bar and other interest groups.
The point of the discussion above is that state courts cannot be lumped
together; instead, there are different state systems, different degrees of
knowledge about those systems, and different preferences among justices in
each of those systems. Notwithstanding these variations, state supreme courts
can look to the experiences of other states in understanding the risks of some
type of in-state backlash. When justices in other states lose reelection because
of their rulings on the death penalty or when the decisions of other state courts

(2007).
141. See infra notes 188-91 (addressing judicial elections); infra notes 287-90
(addressing Hawaii); infra notes 324-26 (addressing California).
142. See supra notes 1-13.
143. The consequences on which I focus are tied to the judicial role vis-a-vis other
actors, including elected officials, the public, and interest groups. This broader issue of
pragmatism (i.e., whether court rulings serve the public good) is beyond the scope of this
Article. For additional discussion of judicial pragmatism, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
How JUDGES THINK (2008).
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on same-sex marriage are overridden by constitutional amendments, there is
good reason for a justice to think about whether there are comparable risks in
her state.
My analysis will proceed in three parts. First, I will provide a quick tour of
the dominant political science models governing U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking. Because there is no comparable literature on state supreme court
decision-making, 144 I will look to the U.S. Supreme Court literature to identify
the types of questions that must be asked in assessing whether state supreme
courts are likely to take consequences into account. Second, I will discuss the
types of risks that state supreme courts face, the ability of state justices to
assess these risks, and the competing motivations of state justices when
weighing these risks. Third, I will wrap up by highlighting (once again) that
state court systems are fundamentally different from each other but that state
supreme courts can nonetheless better assess risks by looking to the
experiences of other states.
A. The Political Science Models

The dominant political science models posit that U.S. Supreme Court
Justices are principally interested in pursuing favored policies. The attitudinal
model assumes that judges vote "reflexively in each case; that is, they cast their
votes based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and legal issues
presented, rather than by considering, in addition, how other judges or
institutions are likely to react to the decision." 145 A second model, the strategic
model, contends that judges account for the reactions of others when advancing
their legal or policy preferences. 146 A Supreme Court Justice, for example,
might take implementation concerns, including potential resistance from either
elected officials or the American people, into account. 147 A third model, the
new institutionalism, emphasizes that Supreme Court Justices strategically
pursue both "institutional" and "ideological" preferences. 148 Accordingly, the

144. Although there is an extensive literature on the impact of judicial elections on
state court decision-making, there is no literature that discusses generally the various types
of consequences that state courts might confront, nor is there a literature that meaningfully
assesses the capacity of state supreme court justices to assess consequences.
145. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 591 (2003). See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
146. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12 ( 1998) (explaining
that "[t]o say that a justice acts strategically is to say that she realizes that her success or
failure depends on the preferences of other actors and the actions she expects them to take").
147. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court considers possible elected government
backlash); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model,
and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996)
(explaining that the Court accounts for public opinion).
148. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political
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Court cannot lose sight of its responsibility to "maintain a distinctive and
valued presence in the political system" by advancing some "vision of the
special functions that [it] should perform." 149 In recent years, some legal
scholars and political scientists have challenged the premise of these models,
contending that Justices are not simply single-minded maximizers of legal
and/or policy preferences. Employing social psychology literature and pointing
to the fundamental desire to be liked or respected by other people, these
scholars claim that Supreme Court Justices-while very much interested in the
pursuit of favored policies-are also interested in winning favor with audiences
they care about (including other judges, bar groups, legal academics, and media
elites). 150
The deep divisions between political science models largely wash away
when these models are transported to the state supreme courts. In particular, all
of these models would support state supreme court justices paying attention to
certain types of consequences. Consider, for example, the divide between the
strategic and attitudinal models over whether backlash risks ever warrant the
casting of votes that deviate from the Justices' sincere ideological attitudes and
values. In arguing against consequential decision-making, the attitudinal model
assumes that the Court controls its caseload, that its members are life tenured
and therefore lack electoral or political accountability, that elected officials are
unlikely to overrule Court decisions (statutory as well as constitutional), and
that the Justices are often uncertain about legislative preferences. 151 Most state
supreme courts, however, lack the political insulation of the U.S. Supreme
Court. As discussed in Part I, thirty-eight states have some form of judicial
elections, nearly all states have significantly less docket control than the U.S.
Supreme Court, and eighteen states give voters the right to amend state
constitutions through the initiative process. Furthermore, the relationship
between state courts and lawmakers is completely different than at the federal
level. Against this backdrop, even under the attitudinal model, state supreme
Reading ofUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 757, 783 (1996).
149. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 85 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999). More generally, the new institutionalism thinks that Supreme
Court Justices care about legal as well as policy goals. See generally SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra.
150. For two prominent examples of scholarship addressing the psychological
motivations of Supreme Court Justices and, in doing so, critiquing the dominant political
science models, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 9-24 (2006);
Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615,615-17 (2000).
151. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 145, at 92-93; Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-ofPowers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 28,42
(1997). Indeed, Segal and Spaeth recognize that "the absence of these factors may hinder the
personal policy-making capabilities of lower court judges or judges in other political
systems." SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 145, at 92-93.
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court justices "who wish to see their personal preferences translated into public
policy" will often have incentive to take into account the possibility of
legislative or voter backlash (especially justices in states subject to popular
election). 152
The prospect of public outrage is also salient to the new institutionalist and
social psychology models. Lacking the power of the purse and the sword, New
Institutionalists emphasize that a judge's power "rests on the willingness of the
public, and the political actors accountable to it, to respect his independence
and the decrees of the court." 153 Under this view, "[i]f the Court is concerned
about its own place in the constitutional order, and wants to maintain its
legitimacy and power, it might take account of outrage as a method of selfpreservation. " 15 The New Institutionalists make this point in the context of the
politically insulated U.S. Supreme Court, a court whose legitimacy is rarely
challenged by the public or elected officials. 155 Needless to say, whatever one
thinks of the saliency of this claim as applied to the U.S. Supreme Court, 156 the
vast majority of state supreme courts lack similar protections and are far more
vulnerable to challenges to their legitimacy. 157
By emphasizing that supreme court justices have both psychological as
well as policy motivations, the social psychology model anticipates that judges

152. Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall & Laura Langer, Judicial Choice and the Politics
of Abortion: Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1265, 1271
(1999) (arguing that political scientists should assume that state court justices are "rational,
utility maximizing individuals"). For additional discussion, see infra notes 192-97.
153. Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 261 (2005).
154. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 172.
155. On widespread support for the Supreme Court's institutional legitimacy, see
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 635, 650-60 (1992); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira &
Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47
AM. J. PoL. Sci. 354, 358-59 (2003). On Congress's support for the Court, see Neal Devins,
Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1337 (2006).
156. Cass Sunstein, while noting legitimacy concerns, think that these risks are only a
small part of the picture because the Court's authority has proved stable over time. Sunstein,
supra note 19, at 172; see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 145, at 424-29.
157. Most visibly, judges in thirty-eight states are subject to some type of election
scheme. Some of these schemes involve contested elections and, with them, interest group
funding and negative campaigning. See Gibson, supra note 33, at 59-62. Empirical evidence
about such campaigns suggest that a reservoir of good will remains that state supreme courts
enjoy but that state court justices have good reason to be concerned about judicial elections
damaging their courts' legitimacies. See id. at 72; James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira,
Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of
Courts be Rescued by Recusals? (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies
Paper,
2009)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l428723. For one example of state
justices expressly raising legitimacy concerns in the context of fundraising for judicial
elections, see infra note 197. For a sustained analysis of the relationship between judicial
elections and state court legitimacy, see David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008).
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think about consequences. For politically insulated U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, there is reason to think that Justices care about their standing with
fellow jurists, media and academic elites, and interest groups who share their
values. 158 Most state supreme court justices are entangled with voters and
elected officials and, consequently, have much different points of reference
than U.S. Supreme Court Justices. For reasons that I will soon discuss, 159 the
political and social contacts of state supreme court justices shape both their
ability to assess consequences and their interest in taking consequences into
account.
State courts are far more vulnerable to political influence than are federal
courts-so much so that all political science models used to describe supreme
court decision-making anticipate that state supreme court justices would take
consequences into account. 160 Differences between state systems, however,
suggest that there will be significant variance in how consequences are taken
into account. Differences in the preferences of state supreme court justices
(e.g., variations in the intensity of their commitment to a particular policy
outcome or competing conceptions of the judicial role) also point to variances
in how consequences will be weighed. For the balance of this Part, I will
consider the ways that consequential analysis may play out in different states.
B. Consequentialism and State Supreme Courts

In understanding how state supreme court justices will take consequences
into account, I will now look at the varying incentives and capacities of state
supreme court justices. This discussion will highlight why most state justices
have the incentive and capacity to take account of consequences. It will also
underscore fundamental differences among state systems and call attention to
the ways that state courts can learn from each other.
1. Incentives
All political science models assume that the primary motivation of each
U.S. Supreme Court Justice is the advancement of that Justice's preferred legal
policy vision. When transferred to the state supreme court context, state
supreme court justices would be most concerned about: (1) removal from
office; (2) overturning of their decisions through a constitutional amendment or

158. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2010).
159. See infra notes 161-210 and accompanying text.
160. This Article takes no position on which political science model best explains
judicial behavior. Since all models support some form of consequential analysis by state
supreme court justices (with the possible exception of the few states whose courts are
politically insulated), the balance of this Part will focus on identifying consequences that
may be salient to the various political science models.
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legislative enactment; and (3) lack of enforcement of their opinions due to lack
of political will. 161 Any of these three consequences of their decisions might
spill over to cast doubt on the court's legitimacy and thus further undermine the
court's power to bind elected officials or voters through judicial edicts.
The most draconian of these consequences is removal from office. Public
officials in electoral settings, even those with so-called safe seats, often fear
electoral defeat. 162 Public officials subject to rea£pointment likewise take steps
to curry favor with the reappointing body. 1 3 In other words, "like all
policymakers in a democracy, [state supreme court justices] must retain their
posts in order to achieve their policy goals." 164
Retention schemes, as already noted, vary dramatically from state to state,
as does the term length for state supreme court justices. 165 In four states,
supreme court justices either have life tenure or serve until the age of
seventy; 166 in all other states, justices are subject to some type of regular
retention decision-principally elections (thirty-eight states) but also
gubernatorial (three states), legislative (four states), or judicial (one state)
reappointment. 167 In assessing potential backlash risks for their decisions, state
supreme court justices can look to statistics about the risks of losing their seats
under varying retention schemes, to data about the changing nature of judicial
retention politics, and, of course, to their own experiences and the experiences
of their colleagues in seeking reappointment or reelection. This data reveals
that the face of judicial elections has been transformed since the mid-1980s.
Before that time, elections were seen as "'low key affairs, conducted with
civility and dignity,' which were 'as exciting as a game of checkers ...
(p]layed by mail."' 168 Over the past twenty-five years (and especially in the

161. This list is extrapolated from arguments set forth in Sunstein, supra note 19, at

171-72.
162. This is one of the foundational assumptions of political scientists who study
congressional motivations. See MORRIS P. FIORlNA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES (1974); JOHN KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981).
On the issue of why lawmakers--even in safe districts-increasingly focus their attention on
reelection concerns, see Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations
and Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1538-39 (2005).
163. See Shepherd, supra note 110.
164. Elisha Carol Savchak & A.J . Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and
Retention Constituencies: Testing Strategies ofJudicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & PoL'Y
Q. 394, 396 (2007).
165. See supra notes 76-111 and accompanying text.
166. Those states are Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New Jersey
(although in New Jersey, justices must be reappointed by the governor once in order to serve
a term that ends when they turn seventy years old). See supra tbl.l.
167. See id.
168. Shepherd, supra note 110, at 1602 (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selection and

Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. I, 19 (1995), and
Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1079-80
(2007)) (alterations in original).
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past several years), "[t]he confluence of broadened freedom for [judicial
candidates] to speak out on issues, the increasing importance of state judicial
policies, and the infusion of money into judicial campaigns have produced what
may be described as the 'Perfect Storm' of judicial elections." 169
Not surprisingly, justices in states with partisan retention schemes are more
vulnerable to losing their seats than are justices in other states. In 2008, for
example, there were fifty-nine elections for state supreme courts-twenty
retention elections (with no opposing candidate), twenty-six contested
elections, and thirteen uncontested elections. All justices in retention elections
retained their seats, while six of twenty-six (or twenty-three percent) lost their
seats in contested elections. 170 This 2008 retention election data-suggesting
extremely limited election risks--conforms with past practices. From 19902000, three of 177 state supreme court justices (or 1. 7 percent) were defeated in
retention elections, 171 and 1964-2006 data suggests that judges in retention
election states lose about one percent of the time. 172 In sharp contrast, 2008
data reveals a dramatic spike in electoral defeats in contested races, especially
in nonpartisan elections (where there is no party identification on the ballot).
From 1990 to 2000, 8.3 percent (compared to twenty-three percent in 2008) of
justices lost their seats in contested elections. Incumbent state supreme court
justices in statewide partisan elections were ousted in twenty-nine percent of all
1990-2000 contests; justices seeking reelection in nonpartisan contests won
ninety-nine percent of 1990-2000 contests. 173 In 2008, four (and arguably five)
of the six state supreme court justices who lost their seats came from states with
nonpartisan elections. 174
Combusting with reelection risks, state supreme court justices are under
increasing pressure to raise significant funds to run for reelection. 175 In part,

169. Gibson, supra note 33, at 60.
170. David Rottman, Judicial Elections in 2008, in CoUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra
note 51, at 290, 303-04. If one accounts for the thirteen uncontested elections, six of thirtynine justices (or fifteen percent) lost their seats in states that allow for contested elections.
171. Chris W. Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent Defeats in State Supreme Court
Elections, 33 AM. PoL. REs. 818, 825 (2005).
172. See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE
208, 210 (2007); see also Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 164, at 395 (noting that, from
1964 to 1990, only fifty-two of 4,588 judges lost retention elections).
173. Bonneau, supra note 171, at 834.
174. Rottman, supra note I 70, at 303-04. One of the defeated justices hailed from
Michigan, a state in which candidates are nominated by political parties but the voting ballot
does not specify party affiliation.
175. See generally RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). Furthermore, because
increased spending on judicial elections leads to higher levels of voting, there is good reason
to think that state justices will feel ever-increasing pressure to raise funds to stave off
election challenges. See Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The
Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections, 52 AM. J. PoL.
SCI. 457 (2008).
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increasing fundraising is tied to the simple fact that there are more contested
elections than ever before. In 1984, two-thirds of state supreme court justices
ran unopposed in nonpartisan elections. 176 By 2000, three-fourths of
nonpartisan elections were contested. 177 For partisan races, the number of
justices running unopposed declined from twenty-six percent in 1988 to five
percent in 2000. 178 Increasing fundraising is also tied to the fact that state
supreme court races increasingly feature attack ads and significant interest
group involvement. 179 For contested state supreme court races (partisan and
nonpartisan elections), the average total expenditure in 2000 was $600,000, up
from $400,000 in 1990. 180 In partisan races, the average total was $1.5
million. 181 By 2004, $24 million was spent on state supreme court races, an
increase of almost twenty percent from 2000. 182 This trend has continuedwith noticeable spikes of both negative ads and television ads in 2006 races. 183
Pro-business interest groups are at the center of the change, now accounting for
approximately forty-five percent of all fundraising and ninety percent of special
interest television advertising. 184
Punctuating these national trends, state supreme court justices have either
experienced or witnessed judicial elections that resulted in the outright
transformation of entire state supreme courts. On high salience issues
176. See Joanna Shepherd, The Business of Judicial Elections 9-11 (Oct. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of
Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST.
SYS. J. 21 (2004) and Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, Predicting Challengers in
State Supreme Court Elections: Context and the Politics of Institutional Design, 56 POL.
REs. Q. 337 (2003)).
177. See Shepherd, supra note 110, at 1602.
178. !d.
179. For an important series of news stories calling attention to increasing
politicization of state supreme court races, see Adam Liptak, Judges Mix with Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at B 1; Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan
Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24. 2004, at 11; Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One
Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at AI.
180. Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection:
Empiricism and the Transformation of the Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REv.
551,566 (2008).
181. Shepherd, supra note 110, at 1603 .
. 182. Gibson, supra note 33, at 60.
183. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 8
(2006), available at brennan.3cdn.net/49c 18b6cb 18960b2f9_ z6m62gwji.pdf (explaining
negative ads); Rottman, supra note 170, at 290 (explaining spending on television ads). The
intensity and partisanship of judicial elections was spurred on by numerous developments,
most notably the increasing recognition of the importance of state supreme courts and a 2002
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002),
recognizing that candidates for judicial elections have free speech rights to make policy
statements during their campaigns. See Gibson, supra note 33, at 59.
184. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 183, at 18-19. For additional discussion of interest
group influences, see Clive S. Thomas et al., Interest Groups and State Court Elections: A
New Era and its Challenges, 87 JUDICATURE 135 (2003).
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(especially abortion, the death penalty, and search and seizure), 185 justices are
well aware that opposition groups might target them for politically unpopular
rulings and often take electoral risks into account. 186 Indeed, governors have
publicly denounced justices (even those justices whom they appointed
themselves) for their votes in capital cases and have pushed for their ouster in
retention elections. 187 In 1986, three California Supreme Court justices lost
retention elections because of their votes in opposition to the death penalty. 188
Likewise, opposition to Texas Supreme Court tort reform decisions prompted a
backlash in the late 1980s that resulted in defeat-in partisan elections-of
plaintiff-friendly justices. 189 In 2008, three Mississippi Supreme Court justices
lost nonpartisan elections. 190 Other states in which justices were ousted because
of their votes include Idaho, Tennessee, and Nevada. 191

185. Campaigns to unseat incumbent judges have focused on a broad range of issues,
including crime control, abortion, victims' rights, tort reform, homosexual rights, school
funding, and abortion. See Charles Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,
49-50 (2003). States that have had contested elections over these issues include Mississippi,
Nebraska, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, California, Georgia, Idaho, Alabama, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. See id.
186. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv.
759,760-65,784-92 (1995) (giving multiple examples of opposition groups targeting sitting
justices for politically unpopular death penalty votes); Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent
Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1 I 17,
1120 (1987) [hereinafter Hall, Constituent Influence] (noting that state supreme court
justices perceive death penalty cases as the most likely to be reported on by the media and
the most focused on by opponents in judicial elections); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral
Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 431 (1992)
[hereinafter Hall, Electoral Politics] (showing the statistically significant relationship
between judicial election systems and the willingness of liberal justices to vote with
conservative majority on death issues); see also Brace et. al, supra note 152, at 1291-94
(noting that justices subject to competitive election are less likely to hear abortion cases and
more likely to uphold state regulations).
187. Justices themselves admit to engaging in strategic behavior in capital cases. See
Bright & Keenan, supra note 186, at 787, 799.
188. See Croley, supra note 105, at 737. After the replacement of these three justices,
the California Supreme Court became known for its affirmance in capital cases with a fiveyear affirmance rate of ninety-seven percent-one of the highest in the nation. See Bright &
Keenan, supra note 186, at 761. By way of contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ignored a voter-approved constitutional amendment to reinstate the death penalty
(after the state supreme court found that the state constitution forbids the death penalty).
Justices on the Massachusetts court could pursue their preferred legal policy position
because they are not subject to any type of reelection or reappointment. For additional
discussion of the Massachusetts court, see infra notes 300, 303.
189. KYLE CHEEK & ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN TEXAS:
PARTISANSHIP, MONEY, AND POLITICS IN STATE COURTS 40-43 (2005).
190. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 51, at 286 (2009); Chandler Clay, What a
Year for Elections, MISS. Bus. J., Dec. 22, 2008, at 14.
191. See Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court 's Thoughts? The High Price of
Judicial Elections, 3 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 29, 32 (2008) (discussing 2006 defeat of Nevada
Supreme Court Justice Nancy Becker due to her vote in a civil tax case); Steven B. Bright,
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There is ample empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrating that
justices, "regardless of how safe their positions are[,] ... often fear voters." 192
Consider, for example, the following statements by state supreme court
justices: Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus remarked that
"[t]here's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political
consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near
193
election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub."
On
criminal justice issues, justices on both the Georgia and Louisiana Supreme
Court admitted to engaging in strategic behavior to stave off electoral defeat.
The Louisiana justice "d[id] not dissent in death penalty cases against an
opinion of the court to affirm a defendant's conviction and sentence, expressly
because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt personal
194
preferences to the contrary."
The Georgia justice, after admitting to
overlooking errors in criminal cases and leaving it to the federal courts to
remedy those mistakes through habeas corpus petitions, remarked that federal
195
judges "have lifetime appointments. Let them make the hard decisions."
Perhaps more telling, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a 2009 U.S.
Supreme Court decision about the influence of campaign contributions on state
k"mg, 196 a coaI"ttton
. o f twenty-seven fiormer ch"te f
. .
supreme court dectswn-ma

Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and
Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 314-15
(1997) (discussing defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White due to her vote
in a capital case); Schotland, supra note 109, at 883-84 (discussing 2000 defeat of Idaho
Supreme Court Justice Cathy Silak due to her decision in an environmental law case). In
addition to electoral defeats, some state justices have been thwarted in their efforts to seek
federal appellate court nominations because of controversial votes cast on death penalty
cases. See Robyn Blumner, Dole's Slap at the 'Purest Jurist,' ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.
28, 1996, at 10 (discussing Sen. Bob Dole's attack on Clinton's appointment of Rosemary
Barkett, former Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court and current Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge); Bright, supra, at 315-17, 319 (discussing attack ads and resistance
to Barkett for her dissent in one death penalty decision out of over 3000 opinions during her
eight years on the Florida Supreme Court).
192. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in
the American States, 23 AM. PoL. Q. 485, 488 (1995) (listing studies); see also DANIEL R.
PlNELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY
130 (1995) (discussing way in which selection methods "significantly affect judicial
policy"); Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 175, at 167 (noting that justices subject to
reelection are risk-averse); Valerie Hoekstra, Competing Constraints: State Court Responses
to Supreme Court Decisions on Legislation on Wages and Hours, 58 POL. REs. Q. 317
(2005) (showing that justices set aside policy preferences in order to maintain their seats);
Joanna Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
169, 175 (2009) (listing studies of the effect of retention politics on judges' decisions).
193. Paul Reidinger, The Politics ofJudging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987).
194. Hall, Constituent Influence, supra note 186, at 1120.
195. Bright & Keenan, supra note 186, at 799.
196. The precise issue before the Court was whether a state justice needed to recuse
himself from a case in which one of the parties had made significant campaign contributions
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justices filed an amicus brief stating that "[s]ubstantial financial support of a
judicial candidate-whether contributions to the judge's campaign committee
or independent expenditures--can influence a judge's future decisions, both
197
consciously and unconsciously."
Empirical studies likewise support the linkage between judicial elections
(including fundraising) and state supreme court decision-making. Not
surprisingly, the strongest results were found when analyzing justices facing
partisan reelections. 198 This is especially true of justices rendering decisions
near the time of an election. 199 Elected justices, moreover, are less prone to
dissent in cases where their views vary from voter preferences. 200 Indeed,
recognizing the increasing need of raising campaign funds, elected justices
(especially in states with contested elections) will often vote with business and
other interest groups who help fund their reelection efforts. 201 Finally, even
state justices who are subject to reappointment (not reelection) adjust their

to the justice. By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court concluded that recusal was required,
noting that "there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable
perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent." Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009).
197. Brief for Twenty-seven Former Chief Justices as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). The
brief also claimed that justices, as humans, were "fundamentally incapable of complete
impartiality and indifference" and that there are some cases where a judge cannot recognize
her own bias. I d. A competing brief was filed by ten current and former state court justices.
That brief focused on the presumption of judicial integrity. Brief for Ten Current and Former
Chief Justices and Justices as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).
198. Shepherd, supra note 192, at 188.
199. See Savchak & Barghothi, supra note 164, at 400,405-06.
200. Hall, Constituent Influence, supra note 186, at 1122-23; Hall, Electoral Politics,
supra note 186, at 438-39 (noting that liberal justices do not dissent in death cases when
reelection looms or when their most recent electoral victory was by a narrow margin).
201. See Shepherd, supra note 176, at 19-21. For other studies demonstrating a linkage
between campaign contributions and state supreme court decision-making, see Damon M.
Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. &
PoL'Y Q. 281 (2007) (finding correlation between campaign contributions and judicial
decisions on Georgia Supreme Court); Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections:
The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court
Justices, 1994-1997, 31 PoL. & PoL'Y 314,315 (2003) (looking at civil cases involving two
business litigants); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study
ofArbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & PoL. 645, 646 (1999) (finding a "remarkably close
correlation between a justice's votes on arbitration cases and his or her source of campaign
funds"); see also Brief of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et a!. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009)
(No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45972, at *14 (noting, among other studies, a study of the Texas
Supreme Court which showed that petitioners who had donated more than $250,000 were ten
times more likely than noncontribuiors to have a petition for discretionary review granted).
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decision-making to conform to the preferences of the appointing body. 202
Like retention risks (which vary considerably depending on the type of
retention scheme and length of term), the risk of popular or lawmaker
invalidation of state supreme court decision-making varies significantly from
state to state. Consider, for example, the twenty-four states that allow for direct
democracy overrides of state court decision-making. The number of voter
initiatives has dramatically increased since 1970. 203 Five of the twenty-four
states, however, have highly restrictive rules that severely limit the number of
initiatives, whereas the five strongest initiative states adopted half of all
initiatives (a large enough proportion that some of these states have developed
"sophisticated network[ s] of specialized professionals to assist initiative
proponents."). 204 More generally, as discussed in Part I, significant differences
in the procedures and customs of states noticeably impact the willingness and
ability of state lawmakers to send constitutional amendments out to the voters
for approval (not to mention differences in whether a majority or supermajority
vote is required). 205
These variances in state procedures and practices highlight the need to
recognize differences among states (with the exception of the national trend for
state lawmakers and voters to pursue constitutional change through the
amendment process). 206 At the same time, national patterns are highly salient in
states which have seen an upsurge in amendments and in states with easy-toamend constitutions. 207 More than that, on select issues (most notably the death
penalty and same-sex marriage), state supreme court justices are aware of the
propensity of voters and lawmakers to pursue constitutional change either to
override or preempt judicial decision-making. 208 State justices subject to
reelection-especially in the nineteen states that have contested elections-

202. See Shepherd, supra note 110 (noting that justices seeking reappointment are
more likely to favor government positions than justices who do not seek reappointment).
203. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 46-50.
204. Jd. at 53. For additional discussion, see id. at 50-55.
205. See supra notes 50-58.
206. See Cain & Noll, supra note 51, at 1520; supra note 52.
207. See generally MILLER, supra note 58, at 50-52 (noting trends in direct-democracy
states, including dramatic upswing of direct democracy measures); Cain & Noll, supra note
51, at 1521-25 (discussing hyper-amendability of state constitutions).
208. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 198-215; see also supra notes 1-13, 188; infra notes
324-28. Another example is a 2002 Florida constitutional amendment forbidding the Florida
Supreme Court from recognizing broader search and seizure protections than those
recognized by U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution. FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 12. This amendment was a reaction to the Florida court's expansive understanding
of search and seizure protections. See AM. BAR Ass'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 35 (2003) (noting that prior to the
amendment, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the state search and seizure clause, in
eighty percent of cases, to grant broader rights than granted under U.S. Supreme Court
interpretations of the federal search and seizure clause whereas after the amendment, the
Florida Supreme Court granted broader rights in only eighteen percent of cases).
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must also take into account the possibility that an initiative battle over a state
court ruling will provide fodder for those who would want to oust the justice in
her next judicial election.Z 09
For similar reasons, state supreme court justices might also consider the
possibility that their decisions go unenforced for lack of political will. 210 After
all, there is nothing to be gained by rendering a decision which does not
tangibly advance favored policies but, instead, casts doubt on the court's
authority. For example, public and elected government resistance to school
finance rulings in New Jersey and Vermont both undercut the efficac?' of those
rulings and drew negative attention to those state supreme courts. 21 In states
with judicial elections, politically controversial rulings that spark elected
government non-acquiescence might spill over into judicial election campaigns.
The prospect of voters or elected officials ignoring or nullifying (through a
constitutional amendment) state supreme court rulings and/or punishing state
justices by ousting them from office also ties to the docket control powers of
state supreme courts. Several state courts, as noted in Part I, cannot make
aggressive use of the "passive virtues" of certiorari denials, state action
limitations, or justiciability requirements (which, among other things, limit
lawmaker standing and prohibit advisory opinions). 212 Needless to say, there is
greater opportunity for political retaliation in states without meaningful docket
control limits, as the court cannot steer clear of knotty political controversies.
In Florida, for example, the state supreme court is required to issue advisory
opinions about the constitutionality of proposed initiatives. 213 In several states,
state supreme courts have no choice but to hear constitutional challenges to
. meanmg
. to state
state Iaws. 214 I n twe I ve states, state supreme courts must gtve
constitutional provisions containing affirmative rights to welfare, education, or

209. See Gerald F. Uelman, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence
of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1133,
1147-49 (1997).
210. For a discussion of whether state courts have the capacity to assess such risks, see
infra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
211. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Educational Issues and Judicial Oversight, 41 ALB. L.
REv. 1091, 1096-97 (2008) (describing reactions to the New Jersey Supreme Court ruling on
school financing in Abbott v. Burke); Aaron J. Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the
States, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1439, 1460-61 (2005) (describing reactions to the Vermont
Supreme Court's ruling in a school finance case and the legislative response). It should be
noted, however, that the Vermont and New Jersey Supreme Courts are politically
insulated-so that some of the backlash risks discussed in this Part are less salient to justices
on those courts. For additional discussion, see infra notes 249-50, 261-65, and
accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 112-33 and accompanying text.
213. FLA. CONST. art. IV,§ 10.
214. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 121, at 1457 (noting that one of the
"[c]omrnon categories of cases that receive mandatory [state supreme court] jurisdiction
include ... cases invalidating a state statute on constitutional grounds").
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just compensation. 215
There is little question that state supreme court justices face a much more
complex political landscape than do the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.
There is also little question that backlash risks vary tremendously from state to
state. In other words, state supreme courts must look to both their constitutional
system and their political norms in assessing consequential risks. 216 At the
same time, state justices can also look to national trends and the experiences of
other states in assessing the likelihood that they will be subject to some type of
backlash risk. Before turning to the question of whether state justices have the
capacity to assess such risks, I would like to make one final comment about the
types of risks that state supreme court justices face. The authority of state
supreme courts, like that of the U.S. Supreme Court, is tied to their "legitimacy,
a product of the substance and perception that shows itself in the people's [and
their representatives] acceptance of the Judiciary." 217 Unlike the politically
isolated U.S. Supreme Court, however, most state supreme courts run
significant legitimacy risks-as contested judicial elections, constitutional
amendment fights, and limited docket control power throws state justices in the
middle of political fights that the U.S. Supreme Court would never confront or
could easily avoid. And while legitimacy risks vary from state to state
(depending on the degree of political protection afforded state supreme court
justices and their decision-making), state courts have frequent occasion to think
about the legitimacy consequences of their rulings.
2. Capacity

The fact that state supreme court justices have incentive to be
consequentialist does not, by itself, support consequential decision-making.
The question remains whether state court justices can discern the necessary
information to adjust their voting in order to maintain office, to not be
overruled, and to receive enforcement of their judicial decisions. Political
scientists and legal academics studying U.S. Supreme Court decision-making
criticize strategic decision-making for precisely this reason, arguing that there

215. See supra notes 130-31.
216. For example, states which make frequent use of direct democracy mechanisms
have weak political parties and strong interest groups. Miller, supra note 58, at 51. For
additional discussion, see infra notes 248-328 and accompanying text (highlighting role of
constitutional systems and political norms in same-sex marriage cases).
217. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,865 (1992). Like the U.S.
Supreme Court, state supreme courts lack the powers of the purse and sword and,
consequently, must pay attention to their perceived legitimacy with both the public and state
officeholders. On the linkage between the U.S. Supreme Court's legitimacy and public
acceptance of judicial edicts, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 370, 375
(2009); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DUKEL.J. 703,715 (1994).
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is an information shortfall in assessing consequences, making the determination
of the level of outrage that will result speculative at best, if not a "shot in the
dark." 218 For reasons I will now detail, there is strong support for thinking that
state court justices are equipped to make well-educated guesses about potential
backlash risks in their home state (as opposed to nationwide backlash risks, for
which they have no special expertise).
First, state judges are far better positioned than federal judges to weigh the
costs and benefits of potential backlash. "[S]tate judges are systematically
exposed to and experienced in the legal institutions of their states," they "spend
their professional lives dealing with state legislation and administrative
regulation," and "[t]hey are much more likely than are their federal
counterparts to know or be able to learn readily what is out there, how it came
to be, and understanding how well or badly it works."219 State supreme court
justices echo this sentiment, noting that "state courts are closer to ~olitics than
their federal colleagues, whether . . . elected or appointed" 20 and are
"generally closer to the public, to the legal institutions and environments within
the state, and to the public policy process." 221 In understanding the reasons for
this difference, it is important to consider the backgrounds of state justices, the
ways in which state justices learn about the values and norms of state voters
and officials, and the various ways in which state justices find themselves in the
middle of state politics.
A state supreme court justice is almost certainly a long-time resident of her
state, presumably reads state newspapers, likely sits and lives in the state
capitol, has professional and social interactions with state officials, hears about
state goings-on from numerous sources, and is generally well-informed with
respect to the in-state political climate. 222 As of 2000, 65 .7 percent of state
supreme court justices were born in the state in which they serve and 60.5
percent received their law degrees from a school in that state. 223 Also, 33.1
percent of state justices served as prosecutors at some point in their careers, and

218. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 176; see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 145, at 42429. For additional discussion, see generally Sunstein, supra note 19 (identifying other
critiques of judicial consequentialism, most notably, the idea that consequentialism is
inappropriate to the judicial role to apply the law in same neutral way).
219. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between
the Norm and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 959, 976 (1985).
220. Linde, supra note 125, at 1286.
221. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1168 (quoting Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New
York Court of Appeals).
222. With respect to professional interactions, for example, former Oregon Supreme
Court Justice Hans Linde noted that state justices work both formally and informally with
state lawmakers on law reform projects. Linde, supra note 125, at 1286-87; see also Hans A.
Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS : TOWARDS
INSTITUTIONAL COM1TY 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
223 . Chris W. Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme Courts 2000, 85
JUDICATURE 26, 28-29 (2001).
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fifteen percent formerly served as elected officials (especially in states with
judicial elections). 224 All of these factors lead to a better informed and
25
connected judiciary? The numbers vary from state to state; thus state
supreme courts will disBlay varying degrees of knowledge about state
happenings and traditions. 26
State supreme court justices, moreover, are better equipped to assess
backlash risks than U.S. Supreme Court Justices because states are much
smaller (and more knowable political units) and because state courts often find
themselves in the middle of political disputes. 227 Lawmaker standing
(including litigation between lawmakers and the governor), advisory opinions,
common law lawmaking, positive rights, and other similar issues inevitably
inject state supreme courts into the state lawmaking process. 228 And while
there are important differences among state constitutional systems, most state
supreme courts are active participants in the state policymaking apparatus.
More than that, all state courts rely on "highly contested state, and sometimes
county, budgets for funding their facilities, operations, and personnel,"
something that further sensitizes state justices to in-state politics. 229
Most state supreme court justices, finally, are well versed in state politics
because of their direct connections to interest groups, political parties, and
voters. In direct democracy states, state justices may render advisory opinions
about the legality of initiatives, decide legal challenges to initiatives, and
sometimes have their handiwork overturned by initiatives. 23 Far more telling,

°

224. Id. at 28; see also Linde, supra note 125, at 1286.
225. On this point, a simple comparison of state justices to the politically insulated
U.S. Supreme Court is telling. "Of the justices appointed [to the U.S. Supreme Court] from
1969 to 2005, only Sandra Day O'Connor had run for office, and only William Rehnquist
held a political position at the time of appointment." Baum, supra note 150, at 67. In
addition, while state supreme court justices' careers require (to varying degrees) a certain
level of public support, "[f]ew [United States Supreme Court] justices have career ambitions
that would be furthered by public support." Jd. at 63.
226. Some state supreme courts were comprised entirely of natives of the state, while
some courts had no members who were natives (based on 2000 data). See Bonneau, supra
note 223, at 30 tbl.2. The amount of prior elected office experience of high courts also
varies, ranging from one state (South Carolina) in which all members in 2000 had prior
elected experience to twenty-five states where no members had such experience. See id.
227. U.S. Supreme Court Justices typically rely on media coverage, party briefs, and
amicus briefs to assess the preferences of other actors. See Epstein & Knight, supra note
146, at 145-46. State court justices, for reasons detailed in this Subpart, both have access to
better sources of information and are better positioned to assess that information.
228. See supra notes 113-33; see also Linde, supra note 222, at 117-19 (detailing ways
that state judges are engaged in and aware of state politics).
229. Linde, supra note 125, at 1286-87; see also Linde, supra note 222, at 119 (noting
how court administrators work with state judges in proposing legislative measures relating to
the state judicial system).
230. See supra note 213 (explaining justices' issuance of advisory opinions); see also
Miller, supra note 58, at 101-22 (detailing trends in judicial review of state initiatives);
Uelman, supra note 209, at 1148 (noting "unique risk" of judicial invalidation of initiatives
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in states with judicial elections, state supreme court justices reach out to voters
(sometimes by openly taking positions on contested policy questions), raise
money from interest groups, and sometimes run as candidates for political
parties (or otherwise have close ties to political parties). 231 Needless to say,
there is tremendous variation-so that justices who run in partisan elections are
much more connected to state politics than, say, Justices appointed through
some merit plan and subject to retention elections. 32 At the same time, state
justices typically know more about state politics because they are subject to
electoral checks in ways unimaginable to federal court judges.
No doubt, state supreme court justices are much better equipped to assess
consequences than their federal court counterparts. And while state justices
cannot perfectly anticipate what consequences will follow from their decisions,
they are positioned to make well-educated guesses about potential backlash
risks in many of the high visibility cases that they decide. This is true in all
states and especially true in states that subject their justices to electoral checks
and/or limit the docket control of state supreme courts. With that said, state
court justices lack expertise about other state systems-so that the information
shortfall that limits U.S. Supreme Court Justices likewise limits state court
justices interested in gauging nationwide consequences.
C. Wrapping Up
State supreme court justices are, for the most part, able and motivated to
make well-informed predictions about the consequences of their decisions.
Dramatic differences between state systems, state politics, and the personal
preferences of state court justices will define the propensity of different courts
and different justices on the same court to take account of the reactions of
elected government, voters, political parties, interest groups, and elites. No
doubt, politically insulated courts can push doctrinal preferences in ways that
politically exposed courts cannot--especially justices who must win
increasingly costly and contested elections.
Outside of retention risks, however, it is difficult to measure the precise
influence of other types of consequences. 233 Some justices, for example, will
have intense policy preferences. Unless there is strong evidence that a ruling
will prove futile or counterproductive (by, for example, setting in motion the

because "the machinery of the political campaign that led to the enactment of the initiative
will simply be redeployed against the offending judges").
231. See supra notes 169-84.
232. Nonetheless, the political beliefs of judicial candidates play an important role in
merit selections. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L. REv.
675, 675-76 (2009).
233. See supra notes 198-202 (noting empirical studies linking state supreme court
decision-making to retention risks); supra note 34 (noting dearth of empirical studies on
backlash risks--outside of elections--on state supreme courts).
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approval of a constitutional amendment),Z 34 these justices may only take
account of retention risks. These justices, moreover, will likely discount such
risks if they serve in states that use retention elections (where, aside from the
death penalty, there are few issues that are likely to prompt severe voter
backlash). 235 Justices with weaker policy preferences will take into account a
broader spectrum of backlash risks. Furthermore, justices with comparatively
weak policy preferences are likely to take fewer retention or amendment
override risks.
In addition to the intensity of their policy preferences and the degree of
their political insulation, state justices may also be motivated by their personal
reputations (in and/or outside the state) and the reputations of their courts as
leading state supreme courts. 236 Some state justices may aim for their ruling to
advance their policy objectives throughout the country, while others will be
interested primarily in whether their decisions will stick inside their state
borders. Some state justices will also care about how their rulings will affect
their relationships with social networks that they value. Depending on the
retention system employed and other features of their state constitutional
systems, state justices will have varying degrees of personal and professional
contact with elected officials, political parties, bar and other interest groups,
and media and academic elites. 237
All of this is to say that it is impossible to draw hard and fast conclusions
about how state justices will, in fact, take consequences into account. Again,
differences in state systems and the preferences of individual justices will
define which consequences are salient to state supreme court justices.
Correspondingly, differences in state systems are also relevant in assessing the
capacity of state justices to take account of consequences. Some state justices
are regular players in the state political process (because of election schemes,

234. The frequency with which state supreme court rulings are nullified by
constitutional amendments has not been studied in any systematic way. Likewise, the
question of whether state justices take amendment-override risks into account is yet to be
examined in any meaningful way. For additional discussion, see infra notes 307, 321-27 and
accompanying text (discussing relevance of state constitutional amendments on same-sex
marriage to state court decision-making).
235 . On the nexus between the death penalty and judicial behavior, see Bright &
Keenan, supra note 186; Hall, supra note 194; see also supra note 188 (discussing role of
death penalty in California retention elections).
236. The reputation of state supreme courts is typically measured by the frequency
with which their decisions are cited by other courts. See Gregory A. Caldeira, The
Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REv.
178, 186 (1985). Over time, some courts gain reputations for being pathbreakers, a
reputation that becomes a norm affecting the willingness of subsequent courts in the same
state to continue to operate as pathbreakers. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 24, at 237
(noting the reputations of the Alabama, Ohio, and New Jersey Supreme Courts).
237. On the relevance of reference groups to judicial decision-making, see generally
Baum, supra note 150 (contending that justices have psychological as well as policy
motivations).
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docket control limits, and so forth) and are likely to know more about potential
consequences than are justices in states with comparatively little exposure to
the state political apparatus.
Notwithstanding all these variations, it is clear that the capacity of state
supreme court justices does not extend to national consequences. State justices
have no special knowledge about politics in other states and any guess they
would make about the extra-territorial consequences of their decisions would
be little more than a "shot in the dark. " 238 In other words, even if state justices
care about the nationwide pursuit of their favored policies or about enhancing
their reputations with out-of-state audiences, 239 there is little reason for state
courts to affirmatively pursue national objectives when interpreting their
constitutions. On same-sex marriage, for example, the Hawaii Supreme Court
could not have anticipated that the enactment of state and federal "defense of
marriage" statutes would follow in the wake of its same-sex marriage
decision. 240 At that time, same-sex marriage was not on the national radar
screen, so any prediction of out-of-state consequences would have been highly
speculative. Likewise, even though the Massachusetts Supreme Court had
reason to know that its same-sex marriage decision would spark political
controversy, the court could not anticipate all of the out-of-state effects of its
ruling. Indeed, it is still an open question whether either of these decisions, in
fact, impeded the national goal of same-sex marriage. 241
In saying that state justices do not have the capacity to assess nationwide
backlash, I do not mean to suggest that state courts operate in isolation. 242 If
interest groups (especially national interest groups) seek to oust judges or
pursue constitutional reforms in one state, there is no reason to think those
groups will not seek to countermand similar decision-making in other states.
And if these efforts either fail or are not pursued in the first instance, state
courts may have reason to think that they have greater room for
experimentation. Separate and apart from direct repeal efforts, state courts may

238. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 176 (referencing the potential information shortfall of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices).
239. These audiences include media, academics, justices in other states, and national
interest groups. See Baum, supra note 150, at 23-24.
240. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
241. Tonja Jacobi, for example, argues that the Massachusetts decision did not
meaningfully impact same-sex marriage in other states. See Jacobi, supra note 9, at 41-53 .
The Massachusetts court's formal recognition of same-sex marriage-rather than civil
unions-may have advanced the long-term goal of out-of-state recognition of same-sex
marriage, however. See Keck, supra note 14, at 162-64 (noting that Goodridge helped
mobilize supporters of same-sex marriage). For competing perspectives on whether the
Hawaii decision advanced the national goal of same-sex marriage, compare ESKRIDGE, supra
note 5, with KOPPLEMAN, supra note 6.
242. Portions of this paragraph will also appear in my forthcoming book chapter: Neal
Devins, Same-Sex Marriage and the New Judicial Federalism, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (James Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., forthcoming).
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see whether those subject to a court order follow it or, alternatively, resist the
ruling by either dragging their feet or ignoring the ruling altogether. If there is
some type of nonacquiesence, it may make sense to pursue a different remedial
strategy. Perhaps more significant, it may be that a remedy effectively advances
its policy objectives.
State courts are both independent and part of a national system. A statecentered approach to state constitutionalism recognizes their independence. In
particular, state supreme court justices have the incentive and capacity to take
in-state but not nationwide consequences into account. When assessing
consequences, moreover, state justices can look to the distinctive attributes of
their constitutional system as well as the norms and values of state voters and
office-holders. At the same time, just as state constitutions reflect larger
national trends, state courts can learn from other states both in identifying
potential backlash risks and in assessing whether those risks are likely to
happen to them. In Part III, I will discuss state court experiences with same-sex
marriage and, in so doing, carry this point forward in two ways. First, I will call
attention to differences in state constitutional systems, explaining why
politically insulated courts are likely to pursue hot button legal policy
initiatives. Second, I will discuss some of the ways that state courts can look to
other state experiences in assessing potential backlash risks.
III. TAKING CONSEQUENCES INTO ACCOUNT: LESSONS FROM SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE

In Parts I and II of this Article, I explained why state constitutional systems
are widely varied but still connected to other states. When assessing backlash
risks, state justices must look to the distinctive features of their constitution and
the political norms of their state. At the same time, state justices can look to the
constitutions and experiences of other states in gauging these consequences. 243
In this Part, I will carry this discussion forward. By looking at the
characteristics of state supreme courts that were willing to play a path-breaking
244
role on same-sex marriage, I will call attention to the ways that state politics,

243. Further complicating things, state justices do not share the same legal policy
objectives and, consequently, may weigh consequences differently. See supra notes 211-37
and accompanying text. With respect to U.S. Supreme Court Justices, there is good reason to
think that Justices with comparatively weak legal policy preferences are more willing to
moderate their decision-making than Justices with intense policy preferences. See Neal
Devins & Will Federspiel, The Supreme Court, Social Psychology, and Group Formation, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 85, 85-86 (David Klein & Gregory
Mitchell eds., 2010).
244. I have chosen to use same-sex marriage as a case study because it demonstrates
particularly well the ability of state courts to take consequences into account. In the case of
same-sex marriage, the consequences of judicial decisions are at once noticeable to the
general public and discemable by state courts in other jurisdictions. Thus, it is possible to
assess whether state courts, in fact, take consequences into account, and whether politically
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state constitutional systems, and judicial values converge in explaining judicial
behavior. 245 Furthermore, by examining the ways that those state courts could
have looked to the experiences of other states in assessing backlash and other
implementation risks, I will argue that path-breaking state courts can learn from
each other and thereby engage in a national conversation about constitutional
rights.
A. Same-Sex Marriage and the Characteristics of Path-Breaking Courts
From 1993 to 2009, seven state supreme courts interpreted their
constitutions to provide expansive protections to same-sex couples. 246 Four of
these states mandated same-sex marriage (Massachusetts, California,
Connecticut, Iowa); two mandated marriage or civil union protections
(Vermont, New Jersey); one said that it would apply strict scrutiny review in
assessing the state ban on same-sex marriage (Hawaii). 247 In understanding
these decisions, several factors are at play. The legal policy views of these
courts are undoubtedly the most important but so are state constitutional
insulated courts are more likely to play a path-breaking role than democratically accountable
courts. Furthermore, the ever-changing political dynamic of same-sex marriage makes it a
particularly good case study to examine the mechanisms by which state courts can look to
the experiences of other states in assessing potential in-state backlash risks.
245. Path-breaking state courts were not the only ones to rule on same-sex marriage. In
2006, the highest courts in Washington and New York ruled against same-sex couples. In
Washington, the court granted direct review of the trial court's decision. Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). In New York, the court granted certiorari (having
turned down a cert petition in 2005). Hebel v. West, 837 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2006); see Hernandez
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). These decisions are certainly an important part of the
story of same-sex marriage, as are constitutional amendments outlawing same-sex marriage
in several states. At the same time, these decisions do not speak to the ways that state courts
take backlash risks into account when deciding cases. Rather, the actions of both courts
suggest that these courts had legal policy preferences to uphold existing state law. In
Washington (a state which makes use of nonpartisan elections), the court, rather than grant
direct review from the trial court, could have held back to see if the court of appeals would
have upheld the state statute. In New York (a state that uses gubernatorial appointments and
reappointments), the lower courts had ruled against same-sex marriage. If the courts
disagreed with those decisions, they would not have used their docket control power to issue
a binding constitutional decision against their preferred legal policy position.
246. Though it ruled against same-sex couples in Hernandez in 2006, the New York
Court of Appeals found in 2009 that government benefits should be extended to same-sex
couples legally married out-of-state (with three of the seven judges concluding that same-sex
marriages legally performed in other states should be recognized in New York). See Danny
Hakim, Gay Spouses Due Benefits in the State, Court Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at
A29.
247. For the states mandating same-sex marriage, see In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comrn'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003). For the states mandating civil unions, see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). For Hawaii's decision to apply strict
scrutiny, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

HeinOnline -- 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1675 2009-2010

1676

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1629

systems, state political norms, and the reputation of several of these courts as
path-breakers.
1. State constitutional systems

The most salient characteristic shared by all seven courts is their retention
schemes. None of the seven make use of contested judicial elections. 248 Five
are among the eleven states whose justices need not run for reelection. Two
(Massachusetts, New Jersey) are amon~ the four states whose justices are not
subject to reelection or reappointment; 2 9 two (Vermont, Connecticut) are from
the six states who make use of a legislative or gubernatorial reappointments; 250
one (Hawaii) is the only state that makes use of a judicial commission to
reappoint justices. The remaining two (California, Iowa) are from states that
make use of retention elections-elections where incumbent justices win
around ninety-nine percent of the time. 251
With limited-to-no reelection pressure,252 state supreme courts that have
played a path-breaking role on same-sex marriage have far more discretion to
vote their legal policy preferences than justices from states subject to
significant reelection pressure. 253 Moreover, with the notable exception of

248. With respect to judicial appointments, two states make use of merit plan
appointments (Hawaii, Iowa), four use gubernatorial appointments (California, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Vermont), and one uses legislative appointment (Connecticut). See supra
tbl. I. While these appointment schemes call attention to the political insulation of these
courts, I will focus on retention schemes (since judicial behavior is moored to retention, not
appointment, plans).
249. In Massachusetts, justices serve until they are seventy. In New Jersey, justices are
subject to an initial gubernatorial reappointment and then serve until they are seventy. See
supra tbl.l.
250. See id.
251. See supra notes 171-72 (retention election statistics). I do not mean to argue that
there are no electoral risks in retention elections. State justices who vote against death
penalty verdicts, for example, run retention election risks. See Croley, supra note 105, at 737
& n.l44 (discussing the defeat of California justices in a retention election because of their
votes in death penalty cases).
252. In states with retention elections, state courts must avoid decisions that are
fundamentally out-of-step with core values of a majority of voters. See Croley, supra note
188 (discussing ouster of California Supreme Court justices because of their death penalty
votes). In the case of same-sex marriage, however, voters in the two path-breaking states that
made use of retention elections (California, Iowa) were generally supportive of marriage
reform. See irifra notes 279 (Iowa), 282 (California). Indeed, since justices serve twelve-year
terms in California and eight-year terms in Iowa, there was good reason for justices in these
states to think that a majority of voters would support same-sex marriage by the time they
were up for reelection. See AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, supra note 77, at 4, 6; infra note 279
(noting trajectory of voter support for same-sex marriage).
253. In sharp contrast, "[e]lected judges generally lack the job security, the moral
stature, and the professional self-conception to defy entrenched norms or strongly held
preferences about constitutional meaning." David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular
Constitutionalism, COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 73, on file with author).
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California, there is comparatively little risk of voters or legislators nullifying
the constitutional rulings of these courts. 254 In all other states, a constitutional
amendment override would require supermajority support and/or majority
support over a sustained period of time. 255 Consequently, unless their rulings
deviate from voter and lawmaker preferences in some significant way, pathbreaker states (excepting California) are unlikely to face significant
constitutional amendment override pressure. The constitutional schemes and
practices of path-breaker states support this conclusion.
Of the seven path-breaker states, only California and Massachusetts allow
voters to place constitutional amendment proposals on the ballot. 256 For
legislature-sponsored amendments only two (Iowa and Massachusetts) allow
for an amendment to be sent to the voters with only majority (as opposed to
supermajority) support from state lawmakers. 257 Iowa and Massachusetts,
however, are two of twelve states that require consideration of le~islature
proposed constitutional amendments in two successive sessions. 25 Iowa's
constitutional amendment rate of .36 amendments per year is tied with Rhode
Island as the fifth lowest of all states; Massachusetts' rate of .55 is eighth
lowest. 259 Of the original Revolutionary-era states, Massachusetts is the only
one that has its original constitution and has the lowest amendment rate among
states that have had only one Constitution. 260
Vermont and Connecticut have low constitutional amendment rates and
impose particularly onerous requirements on lawmakers who want to put
constitutional amendments on the ballot. 261 Connecticut has a three-fourths
supermajority vote requirement in each house in one session or a majority vote
According to a group of state court judges, "[t]he goal, if you are standing for reelection, is
to avoid scrutiny. The goal in getting elected is to avoid negative attention, to be invisible."
A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1822 (2009).
254. Over the past fifty years, California has approved more direct democracy
initiatives than any other state. Miller, supra note 58, at 50. Its constitutional amendment rate
of 4.2 amendments per year is third only to Alabama and South Carolina. See Lutz, supra
note 50, at 248-49.
255. See infra notes 257-65.
256. John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A
Concept Whose Time Has Passed, Or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at
the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REv. 227, 227 n.2 (1998). For California's rules, see CAL.
CONST. art. 18, §§ 3-4. Massachusetts allows voters to submit direct democracy initiatives to
the state legislature for approval. To reach the ballot, the initiative must be approved by fifty
of the state's two hundred lawmakers in two consecutive sessions. MASS. CONST. art. 48, §§
4-5. This hardly ever occurs as Massachusetts has an especially low constitutional
amendment rate. See Lutz, supra note 50, at 248-49.
257. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 51, at 14 tbl.l.2.
258. Id.
259. Lutz, supra note 50, at 248-49.
260. Id.
261. See id. Vermont has an amendment rate of .25 per year (second lowest);
Connecticut's amendment rate of .96 is well below the 2.9 mean but is around the median of
all states.
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in each of two sessions (with an intervening election between the two
sessions). 262 Vermont only allows amendments to be introduced once every
four years, requires that amendments be passed in two consecutive legislative
sessions, and requires a two-thirds supermajority vote in the state Senate for
passage in the initial legislative session. 263
New Jersey and Hawaii also place meaningful limits on constitutional
amendment proposals. Hawaii requires either a two-thirds supermajority vote in
one session or a majority vote in two sessions. 264 New Jersey similarly requires
a three-fifths super-m~ority vote (of all members) in one session or a majority
vote in two sessions. 65 All in all, path-breaker states are among the most
politically insulated states in the nation. Justices on these courts have less
reason to fear either the loss of their seats or the nullification of their
constitutional rulings. The fact that the constitutional rulings of the Hawaii and
California Supreme Courts were overridden does not negate this conclusion.
The Hawaii ruling was dramatically out-of-step with voter preferences (near~
two-thirds opposed same-sex marriage at the time of the decision).2 6
California's voter initiative scheme makes it an outlier among path-breaker
states.
In addition to override and retention risks, the ability of state supreme court
justices to control their docket impacts on whether a state court will play a
path-breaker role. States without docket control, as discussed in Part II, are
more likely to take backlash risks into account. By the same token, state
supreme courts that reach out to decide an issue likely have strong policy or
reputation preferences and/or anticipate limited backlash risks. In Part I, I
highlighted significant differences in the docket control power of path-breaking
states. Three of these states (Vermont, New Jersey, Iowa) had no choice but to
hear constitutional challenges to state law; the other four had discretion
(although each of those states made use of somewhat different procedures). 267
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the two states (Vermont, New
Jersey) that took middle ground positions-finding for civil unions, not samesex marriage-were among the three states without docket control. The third
state without docket control, Iowa, did find for same-sex marriage but there
was majority support (sixty percent) for overturning the existing marriage
law. 268 States with docket control, most notably California and Massachusetts,
have strong reputations for playing a path-breaking role on individual rights
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 51, at 14-15 tbl.l.2.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Linda Hosek, Residents Draw the Line on Some Gay Rights, HONOLULU STARBULL., Apr. 24, 1991, at A-4.
267. See supra note 120.
268. See Erin Jordan, About 6 in 10 Iowans Back Same-Sex Unions, Poll Finds, DES
MOINES REG., Nov. 26, 2008, at 48.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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questions (something I will soon discuss). 269 Correspondingly, state courts with
docket control that fear political backlash are apt to exercise their discretion to
steer clear of the same-sex marriage issue. Arizona, for example, is one of the
leading direct democracy states and its supreme court denied certiorari to a
same-sex petition in 2004. 270
The specific features of state constitutional systems have undoubtedly
figured into the willingrtess of state supreme courts to play a path-breaking role
.
271 state supreme court JUStices,
. . .It wou ld appear, have
on same-sex mamage.
taken backlash risks into account. No state with contested elections has played
a path-breaking role; only one state with voter-initiated ballot initiatives has
played a path-breaking role. Docket control also seems a factor, as states with
mandatory dockets act more cautiously than states with discretionary dockets.
2. State political norms

When assessing potential backlash risks to judicial recognition of same-sex
marriage, state supreme courts must also look to the political norms of their
state. Those norms include both past practices (the willingness of voters and
elected officials to countermand state supreme courts for politically unpopular
rulings) and the contemporaneous views of voters, interest groups, and elected
officials on the propriety of court-ordered same-sex marriage (or civil unions).
For reasons I will now detail, all state courts except Hawaii operated within
these norms.
Four of the seven path-breaker states (California, Connecticut, Iowa, and
New Jersey) had reason to know that state officials would either back or
acquiesce to their rulings. In California, state lawmakers had twice approved
same-sex marriage legislation.272 And while Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed
that bill, the governor also declared that he would "fight" against efforts to
constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage. 273 In Connecticut, 2005 legislation
269. See infra notes 300-303.
270. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), rev. denied,
2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62. On Arizona's status as one of the five leading direct democracy states,
see Miller, supra note 58, at 50-51.
271. By highlighting variations among state constitutional systems and their impact on
state supreme court decision-making, this Article serves as an addendum to another article in
this Symposium, Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REv.
1583 (20 I 0). Ginsburg and Posner, by calling attention to the ways in which federal
constitutions establish a baseline from which states can experiment, do a wonderful job in
explaining both why state constitutions are far more likely to be amended than federal
constitutions and why state constitutional rights are less deeply entrenched than federal
constitutional rights. At the same time, Ginsburg and Posner do not meaningfully consider
how variations among state constitutional systems also speak to amendment rates and the
entrenchment of rights.
272 . Haley Davies, Legislature Oks Same-Sex Marriage Bill, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 8,
2007, at Bl.
273. Matthew Yi, Governor Against Amendment to Ban Gay Marriage, SFGATE, Apr.
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approved civil unions for gay couples. 274 At that time, many lawmakers said
"that their support for civil unions was less a defensive act against a potential
court ruling than the obvious next step for a state with a fifteen-year history of
expanding gay rights.',n 5 In Iowa, state lawmakers refused to act on a proposal
to amend the Iowa constitution to forbid same-sex marriage, a proposal that
was also opposed by Governor Chet Culver. 276 In New Jersey, 2004 legislation
granted same-sex couples most of the same financial and legal benefits as
married couples and "[s]ince the late 1960s, New Jersey has been a pioneer on
gay rights" by decriminalizing sodomy, prohibiting workplace discrimination,
and granting legal right to non-biological parents in same-sex families. 277
Courts in most path-breaker states were also buoyed by public opinion
polls. With the exception of Vermont and Hawaii, voters did not oppose
judicially mandated same-sex marriage or civil unions. In Connecticut,
seventy-two percent supported, at a minimum, same-sex unions at the time of
the court's October 2008 opinion. 278 In Iowa, sixty percent supported either
same-sex marriage or civil unions. 279 In Massachusetts, opinion polls taken just
before the court's decision revealed that Massachusetts residents supported
same-sex marriage fifty to forty-four percent. 280 In New Jersey, fifty percent

12, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/04/12/MNKK104D39.DTL.
For their part, mayors of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco all backed same-sex
marriage. Jessica Garrison et al., Gay Marriage Vote Is Too Close to Call, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2008, at AI.
274. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2009); William Yardley, In Connecticut. Shifting
Ground on Gay Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at B5.
275. William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions For Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2005 at B5.
276. Jason Clayworth & Jennifer Jacobs, Lawmakers Take Sides on Marriage, DES
MOINES REG., Feb. 10, 2008, at Al; Jonathan Roos, Culver Backs Law Banning Gay
Marriage, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 5, 2007, at B3.
277. Andrew Bruck, Equality in the Garden State: Litigation and Social Activism in the
Struggle for Marriage Equality, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 419, 424 (2008); Jonathan
Schuppe, N.J. Senate Approves Domestic Partners Bill, STAR-LEDGER (NEW JERSEY), Jan. 9,
2004, at 1.
278. Connecticut Voters Like Gov Rell, but Not Tax Hike, Quinnipiac University Poll
Finds; Voters Mixed on Gay Marriage, Civil Unions, QUINNIPIAC U., Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1296.xml?ReleaselD=l017 (noting a February 2007 poll that
found thirty-nine percent of Connecticut voters supporting gay marriage and another thirtythree percent in favor of allowing gays to form civil unions). But the court agreed to hear the
case at a time when it knew that Connecticut voters were evenly split on same-sex marriage.
See Yardley, supra note 274 (reporting the results of a 2005 poll that fifty percent opposed
gay marriage and forty-five percent supported it).
279. See Jordan, supra note 268; see also Jason Hancock, Same-Sex Marriage
Opponents Face Uphill Fight in Iowa, IOWA lNDEP., Apr. 3, 2009,
http:/liowaindependent.com/13558/same-sex-marriage-opponents-face-uphill-fight-in-iowa.
And while a majority did not support same-sex marriage, younger Iowans strongly supported
same-sex marriage. See id. For additional discussion, see infra note 332.
280. Frank Phillips, Support for Gay Marriage Mass. Poll Finds Half in Favor,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2003, at A1 (citing a Boston Globe/WBZ-TV poll).
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supported same-sex marriage and sixty-five percent supported civil unions at
the time of the decision. 281 In California, registered voters supported same sex
marriage by a fifty-one to forty-two percent margin at the time of the court's
May 2008 decision. 282
In Hawaii and Vermont, however, state supreme courts were backed
neither by voters nor elected officials. In Vermont, an opinion poll taken
shortly before the Court's 1999 decision revealed that voters, by a fifty-six to
thirty-three percent margin, supported a constitutional amendment proposal to
"keep Vermont's definition of marriage as the union of one man and one
woman." 283 At that time, more than a third of the House of Representatives had
announced support for amending state law to forbid same-sex marriage. 284
Because it had no choice but to hear the case, however, the Vermont court was
ultimately forced to choose between upholding or nullifying the existing ban on
same-sex marriage. 285 Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the court
would issue a minimalist opinion that invalidated the statute while leaving the
choice of same-sex marriage or civil unions to state lawmakers. 286
The actions of the Hawaii court are harder to understand. While Hawaii has
broad privacy laws and a history of tolerance, 287 its constitutional amendment
rate of 2.56 is sixth highest. 288 Consequently, with two-thirds of Hawaii voters
opposed to same-sex marriage, the prospect of a constitutional amendment
override was real and foreseeable. 289 More to the point, the Hawaii court risked
a constitutional amendment override both by agreeing to hear the case and by
demanding that the state satisfy strict review rather than signaling its
willingness to consider domestic partnership or civil union legislation? 90

281. Press Release, Eagleton lnst. of Polites, Rutgers-Eagleton Poll: New Jerseyans
Now Support Gay Civil Unions by 2-1 (Jun. 23, 2006).
282. Bill Ainsworth, 51 Percent Support Same-Sex Marriage, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
May 28, 2008, at A-1.
283. Press Release, Take It to the People, Support for Traditional Marriage Remains
Strong in Vermont (Dec. 16, 1999). This opinion poll was taken by an advocacy group
opposed to same-sex marriage. With that said, the negative reaction of Vermonters to the
court's decision backs up those poll results. See Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The
Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REv. 148, 183-221 (2000).
284. See Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L.
REv. 93, 103 (2000). In other respects, the Vermont legislature was friendly to same-sex
initiatives. Three years before the Vermont Supreme Court decision, the state legislature
amended its adoption statute to allow for adoption by the "partner of a parent." See id. at
102.
285. For an explanation of why the court could not duck the constitutional issue
through a creative interpretation of the Vermont marriage statute, see id. at 102-03.
286. For additional discussion, see infra notes 298-99, 307-11, and accompanying text.
287. See Linda Hosek, Isles May Be First for Gay Marriage, HONOLULU STAR-BULL,
Apr. 24,1991, atA-1.
288. Lutz, supra note 50, at 248-49.
289. See supra note 264 (noting procedures for amending Hawaii's constitution).
290. Before Hawaii voters approved the marriage amendment in 1998, Hawaii
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The California Supreme Court also had reason to know that its decision
might prompt a constitutional amendment override. Indeed, the campaign to
amend the California Constitution to forbid same-sex marriage began months
291
before the court's May 2008 decision.
But unlike the Hawaii court, the
California court was clearly working within political norms. The state's
political establishment said it would back the court, and the court's ruling
292
matched public opinion polls.
Furthermore, even though the same-sex
marriage ruling invalidated a 2000 voter initiative specifying that "[ o ]n~
2
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,"
the state supreme court has frequently functioned as "a strong check on the
California initiative process"-invalidating initiatives at a higher rate than any
294
other state supreme court.
Needless to say, following voter approval of the
override amendment, the political landscape and with it, state :&olitical norms,
5
had changed. In particular, following past court practice,
the justices
approved the override initiative (rather than make judicial retention elections
the only available democratic outlet for voters to express their disagreement
296
with the court).
State political norms undoubtedly play an important part in
state supreme court decision-making. State courts must look both to the
distinctive features of their constitutional systems and to in-state politics when
sorting out whether a decision may trigger a backlash. Not surprisingly, pathbreaking state supreme courts on the same-sex marriage issue have come from
states where voters and/or political leaders were generally supportive of
expanding state marriage law protections to same-sex couples. The notable
exceptions were Vermont and Hawaii. In Vermont, the court had no choice but
to issue a decision and consequently issued a minimalist ruling that sought to
advance the justices' legal policy preferences without triggering a

lawmakers enacted domestic partnership legislation in 1997, making clear that a less
dramatic decision would have been acceptable to Hawaii lawmakers and voters. For a
detailed treatment of the Hawaii marriage amendment and related domestic partner
legislation, see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai 'i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins,
Meaning and Fate, U. HAW. L. REv. 19, 22 (2000).
291. Lisa Leff, Same-Sex Marriage Amendment Sought, OAKLAND TRIB., Feb.
15, 2008.
292. See sources cited supra notes 272-273, 282.
293. CALF AM. CODE § 308.5 (2000).
294. MILLER, supra note 58, at 109.
295. The obvious point of reference here is People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal.
1979). Frierson approved Proposition 17, a 1972 initiative approved in response to the
California Supreme Court's 1972 invalidation (on state constitutional grounds) of the death
penalty. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 200-05. Indeed, since California approved the
initiative process in 1911, the California Supreme Court has only twice concluded that the
proposed initiative was so sweeping as to constitute an impermissible revision-not an
amendment-to the state constitution. See Bob Egelko, Prop. 8 Issue Hinges on Who Must
Decide-Judges or Voters, S.F. CARON., Nov. 19,2008, at Bl.
296. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009) (holding valid Proposition 8's change to
the constitution defining marriage as between a man and a woman).
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counterproductive backlash. In Hawaii, the court simply miscalculated or
ignored backlash risks. In Subpart B of this Part, I will extend this analysis
further--considering whether out-of-state developments helped inform state
courts of potential backlash risks.
3. Reputation and other motives
Up until now, this Part has viewed state supreme courts as single entities,
not taking into account differences in the values and motivations of individual
justices. More than that, the only consequences I have considered are retention
risks and constitutional amendment overrides. Different justices, however, have
different, sometimes competing, priorities-including, for example, the choice
of advancing their court's reputation as a path-breaker court or, alternatively,
avoiding political conflict with voters and elected officials. 297 In other words,
some of these courts-while paying attention both to their constitutional
systems and to political norms--could have pushed harder or less hard. Courts
could have found for same-sex marriage, not civil unions, or vice versa; courts
with docket power could have deferred a decision.
The most vivid example of this phenomenon is the 1999 Vermont Supreme
Court decision in Baker. In explaining its decision to leave it to the state
legislature to decide whether to enact same-sex marriage or civil union
legislation, the majority openly discussed its fear of a potential in-state
backlash, noting that "[w]hen a democracy is in moral flux . . . [j]udicial
answers . . . may be counterproductive even if they are right. "298 In sharp
contrast, the dissenting justices thought they should issue a definitive ruling
even if the "subject is controversial ... [or] the outcome may be deeply

297. In same-sex marriage cases, majority and dissenting justices did square off on the
respective roles of courts and legislatures-with justices pushing for same-sex marriage
arguing that the court's "role is to stand as a bulwark of a constitution that limits the power
of government to oppress minorities," Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,231 (N.J. 2006), and
justices defending existing marriage statutes condemning "a bare majority of this court, not
satisfied with the pace of democratic change ... [substituting] its own social policy views
for those expressed by the People themselves," In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 457
(Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). Another measure of the salience of
reputational concerns are interviews that California Chief Justice Ronald George gave about
the same-sex marriage decision. For example, George told the Los ANGELES TIMES that the
decision "weighed [more] heavily" than any other case he decided, that "there are times
when doing the right thing means not playing it safe," and that he was "so glad" that oral
arguments were televised." Marcia Dolan, Same-Sex Case Weighed on Chief Justice, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 2008, at Al, A32 (quoting George). Commenting on the decision and
George's role in the case, law professor Gerald Uelman spoke of George's sensitivity to
"how this will be perceived" and his recognition "that this more than any other thing he does
as chief justice will define his legacy." /d. at A32 (quoting Uelman).
298. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888 (Vt. 1999) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 101 (1996)).
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offensive to the strongly held beliefs of many of our citizens."299
Disagreement among justices is also tied to conflicting views about
whether their court should cultivate a reputation of being a path-breaker. In
particular, most path-breaker courts (California, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and Iowa) have well-deserved reputations for being leading state courts,
especially with respect to the expansion of individual rights protections. 300
Some but not all justices on these courts may have a personal interest in
maintaining this reputation, and with it, their status as path-breakers on
individual rights issues. 301 Indeed, the majority opinion of the California
Supreme Court proudly referenced its "landmark [1948] decision" overturning
the state's ban on interracial marriage, noting that the decision, "although
rendered by a deeply divided court, is a judicial opinion whose legitimacy and
constitutional soundness are by now universally recognized."302 Reputational
concerns may also have been at play in Massachusetts. Chief Justice Margaret
Marshall has strong personal connections to media and academic elites,
connections that may have influenced her determination to find a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage and to cite foreign law sources in her opinion. 303
Whether or not reputational concerns meaningfully contributed to the

299. Id. at 912 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In making this
point, the dissenters pointed to the state court's mandatory jurisdiction-arguing that the
Vermont Constitution anticipates judicial review of all legislative decision-making. Id. For a
competing view, see supra text accompanying notes 267-68 (suggesting that courts without
docket power are less apt to take political risks).
300. On the California court, see Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, "Followed Rates"
and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 683 (2007); on the
Massachusetts court, see SEAN 0. HOGAN, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT:
PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 282-83 (2006); on the California and Massachusetts courts,
see Alan Rogers, State Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty, 20 J. POL'Y HIST. 143
(2008); on the New Jersey court, see TARR & PORTER, supra note 24, at 237; on the New
Jersey and Massachusetts courts, see Henry R. Glick, Judicial Innovation and Policy ReInvention: State Supreme Courts and the Right to Die, 45 W. PoL. Q. 71 (1992); on the Iowa
court, see Rex Laird, Iowa Court Typically Ahead on Civil Rights, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 9,
2008, at A9.
301. See supra notes 150, 158 and accompanying text (discussing social psychology
model of judicial decision-making).
302. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399, cited in Joanna Grossman & Linda
McClain, The California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples:
Why Domestic Partnerships Are Not Enough, FINDLAW, May 27, 2008,
http://writ.news.findlaw .com/grossman/20080527 .html.
303. Chief Justice Marshall's ties to the legal academy and her interest in having state
courts cite foreign law are underscored by her 2004 Brennan Lecture at New York
University School of Law. See Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court
of Mass., William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice, "Wise Parents
Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age
of Global Jurisprudence (Feb. 9, 2004), in 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1633 (2004). With respect to
media elites, Chief Justice Marshall has, at a minimum, some social contact with journalists
by virtue of her marriage to former NEW YORK TIMES columnist and U.S. Supreme Court
correspondent Anthony Lewis.
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outcomes in Massachusetts or California, it is undoubtedly true that the
reputations of Massachusetts and California as path-breaking states informed
the personal predilections of the individual justices who sit on these courts.
More to the point, state supreme courts operate within the boundaries of state
constitutional systems and state political norms (including the reputation of
state courts). The fact that different justices on these courts accord different
weights to backlash risks and to personal and institutional reputation does not
negate the defining role that state systems and norms play in state supreme
court decision-making. Indeed, path-breaking states share one or all of the
following characteristics: political insulation, political norms supporting the
invalidation of existing marriage laws, and the reputation for being a leading
court on civil rights and liberties.
D. How State Courts Can Look to National Trends and the Experiences of
Other States 304

State supreme courts operate within boundaries set by their state
constitutions and state political norms. In assessing backlash risks, however,
state courts need not operate in a vacuum. State justices may be able to look to
the experiences of other states in assessing in-state backlash risks. In this way,
state courts can simultaneously focus their energies on in-state backlash risks
while also looking beyond their borders and, in so doing, participate in a
nationwide dialogue over the meaning of core constitutional values.
With regard to same-sex marriage, there is little question that state justices
knew about some out-of-state developments. And while it is impossible to
measure the impact of these developments on state court decision-making, 305
out-of-state developments certainly should have figured into the calculus of
state courts. In explaining why I think this is so, I will focus my attention on
court decisions in Vermont (1999), Massachusetts (2003), New Jersey (2006),

304. This Subpart addresses themes that will also be explored in my forthcoming book
chapter, Same-Sex Marriage and the New Judicial Federalism, Devins, supra note 242, at
13-34. That book chapter provides a more detailed look at the on-the-ground facts
confronting several state courts deciding same-sex marriage cases.
305. The Vermont Supreme Court explicitly referenced post-Hawaii developments in
its decision. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d. 864, 888, 904 n.7 (Vt. 1999) ("Judicial authority
is not, however, the ultimate source of constitutional authority. Within our constitutional
framework, the people are the final arbiters of what law governs us; they retain the power to
amend our fundamental law. If the people of Vermont wish to overturn a constitutionally
based decision, as happened in Alaska and Hawaii, they may do so."). Other courts have
referenced the passionate debate over same-sex marriage. See In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 399 (noting that the court was "aware, of course, that very strongly held differences
of opinion exist" on same-sex marriage); Kerrigan v. Comrn'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
481 (Conn. 2008) (quoting Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003)); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (noting "deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical
convictions" over same-sex marriage).
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California (2008), and Iowa (2009). 306
The Vermont court, as already noted, explicitly referenced backlash fears.
The court, moreover, pointed to the "instructive" lesson of Hawaiispecifically, the "state constitutional amendment overturn[ing] [the] same-sex
marriage decision. " 307 The Hawaii experience was also relevant for a host of
reasons not mentioned in the court's opinion. The Hawaii constitutional
amendment fight was financed, in part, by out-of-state interest groups. 308 These
and other interest groups also pushed for the enactment of federal and state
Defense of Marriage Acts. 309 So when the Vermont Supreme Court received
seventeen amicus briefs from national interest groups, 310 the justices had
reason to know that a decision validating same-sex marriage would prompt
these groups into action.
By taking out-of-state backlash into account, the Vermont court sought to
mitigate potential in-state backlash-returning the issue to the legislature and
declaring that civil union legislation would satisfy its ruling. The Vermont
court proved to be prescient. After state lawmakers heeded the call to enact
legislation, state voters made clear that they vehemently disagreed with the
court's ruling (suggesting that a more sweeping ruling might have triggered an
intense backlash). The fall 2000 statewide elections were "conducted in
significant part as a referendum on civil unions" and sixteen incumbent
legislators who backed civil unions were unseated, shifting control of the state
house from Democrats to Republicans. 311
Four years later, the Massachusetts court could look to Vermont in
assessing the possibility of lawmakers being ousted from office in an effort to
approve a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. The court
could also look to the role of out-of-state interest groups in Vermont and
elsewhere as "hundreds of [interest] groups" had signed onto amicus briefs in
the Massachusetts case, including "Catholic, Protestant fundamentalist, and

306. Hawaii was the first court to rule on the issue and, consequently, could not look to
the experiences of other states. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruling was one of a spate of
2008-2009 rulings, and any points I would make about Connecticut can be made by
discussing Iowa, the last (for now) of these rulings.
307. Baker, 744 A.2d at 888. The court also noted that Alaska voters had
constitutionally banned same-sex marriage in the wake of a "trial court decision in favor of
same-sex marriage." !d.
308. Elaine Herscher, Ballot Test for Gay Marriage in Alaska, Hawaii, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 26, 1998, at A I.
309. Carolyn Lochhead, GOP Bill Targets Same-Sex Marriages: Measure Would
Affect Benefits, Recognition, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1996, at AI.
310. Baker, 744 A.2d at 866-67.
311. ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 81; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 346 (2d ed. 2008); Keck, supra note 14, at 162
(recognizing electoral defeats but calling attention to Vermont voters' support for numerous
Democratic supporters of civil unions, including the governor who signed the bill).
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Orthodox Jewish groups." 312 Finally, the volatility of same-sex marriage was
underscored by the response of national interest groups to the U.S. Supreme
court's June 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, outlawing anti-sodomy
statutes.3 13 Lawrence fueled public repudiations of same-sex marriage by the
Southern Baptist Convention and the U.S. Convention of Catholic Bishops; it
resulted in same-sex marriage becoming the defining issue for social
conservatives; and it contributed to an increase in public opposition to samesex marriage at the very time the Massachusetts court was set to rule on the
issue. 314
Knowing that then-Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and several state
lawmakers promised to pursue a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage if the
court found a right to same-sex marriage, 315 these out-of-state developments
should have sounded an alarm for the court. 316 Perhaps for this reason, the
court sought to mitigate backlash risks both by delaying its ruling and-instead
of immediately establishing a right to same-sex marriage-remanding the case
to the legislature for 180 days. 317 The court's efforts paid off, as the
constitutional amendment override effort never got off the ground and some
incumbent lawmakers opposed to same-sex marriage lost their seats. 318
Outside of Massachusetts, the court's 2003 decision helped spur a
nationwide campaign against same-sex marriage. Thirteen states approved
amendment bans in 2004, and some commentators claimed that the same-sex
marriage issue helped propel the 2004 candidacies of George W. Bush and

312. Kathleen Burge, SJC Puts Off a Decision on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, July
15, 2003, at AI; Kathleen Burge, SJC to Weigh Arguments on Gay Marriage, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at AI.
313. Klarman, supra note 8, at 459-60 (discussing how the Moral Majority, the Family
Research Council, and others began to address same-sex marriage in response to Lawrence).
314. See Klarman, supra note 8, at 460; Jeffrey A. Rosen, The Next Culture War, in A
YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 73, 74-77 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004);
see also Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege Is Fueling a Resurgence,
NATION, July 5, 2004, at 33; Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again: Right
Wing Braces for Mass. Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2003, at AI.
315. See National Briefing New England: Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at A22; Frank Phillips, Romney's Stance on Civil Unions Draws
Fire: Activists Accuse Governor of "Flip-Flopping" on Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
2005, at AI.
316. For a competing perspective on the period between the Vermont and
Massachusetts decisions (highlighting ways in which there was increasing support for samesex unions), see Keck, supra note 14, at 161 tbl.l.
317. For a detailed assessment of these and other strategic steps undertaken by the
Massachusetts court, see Jacobi, supra note 9.
318. In noting that the court sought to mitigate the impact of its ruling, I do not mean to
suggest that the court, in fact, took out-of-state experiences into account. For reasons
detailed earlier, it may be that Chief Justice Marshall and other members of the court were
especially interested in advancing both the court's legal policy preferences and its reputation
as a leading court on civil rights matters. See supra notes 188, 300, 303.
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other Republicans. 319 In this way, the decision was a visible signal to other
state courts that constitutionalizing same-sex marriage was a high-stakes
gambit.
Enter the New Jersey Supreme Court, which ruled on the same-sex
marriage issue in 2006. The political protections afforded the New Jersey court
as well as the state's political climate set the stage for the New Jersey court to
find for same sex-marriage and, in so doing, to reinforce its image as a
powerful, path-breaking court. 320 The court's four-to-three decision to instead
find for civil unions (and leave it to the legislature to legalize same-sex
marriage) may have been informed by the s~ate of constitutional amendments
that followed the Massachusetts decision. 3 1 Not surprisingly, there was no
backlash in New Jersef' including "no apparent electoral spillover, either
locally or nationally."32 In Arizona, for example, voters (two weeks after the
New Jersey decision) turned down a proposed initiative to outlaw same-sex
marriage. 323
Two years later, the California Supreme Court entered the fray. At this
point, enough state courts had ruled on same-sex marriage that the court could
discern both a range of judicial approaches to the same-sex marriage issue and
a range of responses from state voters and lawmakers. On the one hand, the
flurry of constitutional amendments passed after the Massachusetts decision
called attention to the risks of a potential amendment override. On the other
hand, the ability of both the Massachusetts and the New Jersey courts to
invalidate state marriage laws with limited in-state backlash signaled the
possibility of the California court successfully mandating same-sex marriage.
Also, the trajectory of public opinion and state action pointed to increasing
voter support of (or at least acquiescence to) same-sex marriage. 324 In choosing
whether to take account of developments in other states (and which
developments), the California court was undoubtedly influenced by its
longstanding reputation as a path-breaker and the fact that the state's domestic
319. See Klarman, supra note 8, at 464-70; James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key
to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4. For competing commentary, see
Keck, supra note 14, at 161-64 (noting that the ruling also spurred gay rights activists and
same-sex couples into action); cf Jacobi, supra note ll (questioning backlash claims on
other grounds). For additional commentary about the impact of the court's decision, see
supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
320. See sources cited supra notes 277, 281, 300; see also Bruck, supra note 277, at
424-25 (noting that the state is renowned for a weak legislature and strong judiciary).
321. The fact that the New Jersey court could not deny certiorari and find for same-sex
marriage at a later date may have also impacted its decision. See supra text accompanying
note 120.
322. Keck, supra note 14, at 164.
323. Sonya Geis, New Tactic in Fighting Marriage Initiatives-Opponents Cite Effects
on Straight Couples, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2006, at A3.
324. On changing public opinion, see Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 10, at 234; Keck, supra note 14, at
156.
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partnership law already provided protections "comparable to the status
designated as 'civil unions"' (so that a constitutional amendment override
would be less consequential in California than in a state that did not provide
civil union protections).325 Consequently, rather than play it safe by denying
certiorari and waiting for an even more favorable in-state political climate, the
California court discounted the risk of a constitutional amendment override.
In November 2008, California voters backed a constitutional amendment
overriding the decision. 326 On the same day, voters enacted anti-same-sex
marriage amendments in Arizona and Florida, as well as an Arkansas ballot
measure barring unmarried couples from fostering or adopting children? 27 At
around the same time, however, developments in other states and across the
nation cut in favor of same-sex marriage. In May 2008, New York Governor
David Patterson issued a directive requiring that all state agencies recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions.328 In October 2008, the
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage-a decision
backed by state lawmakers and voters.329 In March and April 2009, lawmakers
in Vermont approved the legalization of same-sex marriage, and lawmakers in
New Hampshire were actively considering same-sex legislation.330 Moreover,
national opinion polls showed increasing voter support for same-sex marriage,
promptin~ the Republican Party to rethink its campaign against same-sex
marriage. 31
In April 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court issued its same-sex marriage
decision. The court did not reference any of these out-of-state developments in
its ruling and it is unclear what role, if any, these developments played in the
justices' decision-making. With increasing public support for same-sex
marriage in Iowa, a constitutional amendment process that would have delayed
any vote on same-sex marriage until November 2012, and the rejection of
same-sex constitutional amendments by lawmakers in earlier sessions, it is
possible that the Iowa court did not consider out-of-state developments.332

325. In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 n.2 (Cal. 2008).
326. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in Three States on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at AI.
327. Keck, supra note 14, at 165.
328. Jeremy W. Peters, New York Backs Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2008, at AI.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75, 278 .
330. See Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Senate Narrowly Approves New Version
of Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at Al6; Abby Goodnough, Rejecting
Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at AI; Abby Goodnough,
Vermont Senate Panel Approves Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21 , 2009, at
Al3.
331. See Adam Nagourney, Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking Stance on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A4 (noting changing poll numbers on gay marriage around time of
Iowa decision).
332. See Monica Davey, Gay Couples in Iowa Win Right to Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
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Alternatively, the Iowa court may have thought that the absence of in-state
backlash in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts was especially
salient-given the strong traditions of judicial independence and practical
barriers to constitutional amendments in Iowa and these other path-breaker
states.
Whether or not the Iowa court looked to the experiences of other state
courts (or other out-of-state evidence) about the sustainability of its same-sex
marriage ruling, it is clear that the Iowa court was far better positioned to assess
backlash risks than, say, the Hawaii court in 1993 or the Vermont court in
1999. The Iowa court could look at the experiences of the other state courts and
related out-of-state developments when assessing in-state backlash risks. The
Hawaii court was operating on a blank slate and the Vermont court could only
look to what had happened in Hawaii (including the responses of other states
and the federal government to the Hawaii decision). All of this highlights a
rather obvious point: over time, as more and more state courts confront an
issue, other states can see how previous decisions play out and better assess
potential backlash and implementation risks.
Same-sex marriage, of course, is an unusual case, as the volume of state
constitutional amendments, proposed federal legislation, and news coverage
sets it apart from nearly all other issues that state courts rule on. At the same
time, there is no reason to think that state courts cannot look to the experiences
of other states in assessing a range of backlash risks, especially potential
implementation problems. Given the paucity of national press coverage of state
supreme-court decision-making, 333 the princifal source for this information
will be the briefs filed by litigants and amici. 33
On this point, state constitutional challenges to school finance schemes (an
issue which has spanned more than thirty-five years and involved most state
supreme courts) are instructive. In recent years, state supreme courts and the
parties appearing before them have paid increasing attention to the experiences
of other states. Briefs and decisions in Colorado (2008), Connecticut (2007),
Kansas (2006), Nebraska (2007), and New York (2006) explicitly reference the

2009, at AI; sources cited supra note 276.
333. See F. Dennis Hale, Newspaper Coverage Limited for State Supreme Court Cases,
27 NEWSPAPER REs. J. 6, 12 & tbl.2 (2006) (finding that sixteen percent of state supreme
court decisions receive substantial news coverage). Indeed, state supreme court justices have
expressed concern about public ignorance of their decisions, agreeing in the spring of 2009
to back an initiative sponsored by the National Center for State Courts and the William &
Mary Law School to find ways to improve public awareness of state supreme court decisionmaking. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution I: In Support of the State Supreme Court
Initiative Proposed by the National Center for State Courts and the William & Mary Law
School
(Jan.
28,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nacmnet.org/news/IInSupportoftheStateSupremeCourtlnitiative.pdf.
334. This tracks U.S. Supreme Court practices. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 146,
at 146-47.
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implementation experiences of other states. 335 For some courts, these
experiences have cut against intervention; for other courts, these experiences
have been instructive in crafting remedies. 336 This is to be expected: State
constitutional systems and state political norms are extremely varied. What is
right for one state is not necessarily right for any other state. At the same time,
for reasons detailed in this Subpart, the experiences of other states can inform
state court decision-making--even if different courts make use of the same
information to reach different conclusions about implementation and backlash
risks.
Let me close this Subpart with what may seem a cliche: "The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience."337 State courts should look first
and foremost to their own traditions and experiences in assessing potential
backlash risks. At the same time, state courts can learn much from the
experiences of other states-looking to those experiences to better inform their
understanding of potential in-state consequences. In this way, state courts can
participate in a nationwide dialogue about fundamental constitutional Issues
while still focusing on that which they know best-their home state.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this Article, I have called attention to the ways that state courts
are at once widely varied and part of a national system. In Parts I and II, I
explained how state constitutional systems differ tremendously from state to
state and, correspondingly, that state justices have the incentive and capacity to
take account of in-state, not nationwide, backlash risks. In this way, Parts I and
II made the case for a state-centered approach to state constitutionalism (and, in
so doing, operated as a critique of academics that make use of national
measures to assess both state constitutional systems and state court decisions).
Yet Parts I and II also discussed how state courts could participate in a
nationwide dialogue with each other over the meaning of core constitutional
values. Specifically, state constitutional systems borrow from each other and
from the Federal Constitution, and reflect larger historical trends. And state
court justices can look to the experiences of other state courts in assessing
335. See Memorandum from Amanda Christensen to Neal Devins, School Finance
(Nov. 30, 2009) (on file with author).
336. Compare Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d
164, 182-83 (Neb. 2007) (throwing case out on justiciability grounds because of failure of
courts in other states to successfully resolve school funding disputes), with Telephone
interview with Michael A. Rebell, Executive Dir., Campaign for Educ. Equity, Columbia
Univ., (Mar. 30, 2009) (describing his argument in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006), in which he urged supreme court justices to look to the
experiences of other states in assessing workable remedies for New York) (notes on file with
author).
337. 0LNER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications 1991)
(1881).
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backlash risks. Part III made the lessons of Parts I and II concrete by looking at
the on-the-ground facts of path-breaking state court decision-making on samesex-marriage. In particular, path-breaking court decision-making is very much
tied to the distinctive features of both state constitutional systems and state
political norms. At the same time, path-breaking courts can look to the
experiences of other courts and national trends in assessing in-state backlash
risks.
By focusing on the incentives and capacity of state courts to take account
of in-state consequences, this Article has also sought to shift the debate over
state constitutionalism towards the implementation of state court decisionmaking. The question of how state courts can maintain their essential autonomy
while learning from each other speaks as much to the consequences of state
court decision-making as it does to the legal reasoning of state courts. Indeed,
unlike the debate over whether there is or should be a coherent theory of state
constitutional interpretation, it seems likely that many (if not most) state court
justices take consequences into account. Correspondingly, by recognizing that
state justices have expertise about their own constitutional systems and political
norms, this Article has explained why state courts are well equipped to take
account of in-state consequences-so that their voice in the national
conversation about constitutional values is informed by that which they have
expertise to speak on. Out-of-state experiences should figure into this calculus
(as state courts can look to the experiences of other states when assessing instate backlash risks); but potential nationwide backlash should not figure into
this decision (as anticipating out-of-state consequences would be a shot in the
dark). 338
Two final comments: First, this Article should be seen for what it is-a
preliminary assessment of why it is that consequence-based state-centered
constitutionalism is a sensible way to carry forward the conversation about the
ways in which state courts speak to each other and the nation. There is much
work to be done. Empirical studies need to be conducted about the impact of
both docket control and state constitutional amendment procedures on state
court decision-making. Other case studies need to be done-to make clear the
linkage between state court decision-making and a state's constitutional system
and political norms. Finally, the mechanisms by which state courts can learn
about salient out-of-state experiences need to be pursued in greater detail. On
this point, my hope is that litigants and amici will recognize the importance of
out-of-state consequences to state court decision-making and, consequently,
that state supreme court briefs will alert state court justices to potentially
relevant out-of-state consequences.
338. State justices, although well positioned to assess in-state consequences, lack
expertise in assessing nationwide consequences ex ante. See supra Part II.B.2. More than
that, as revealed by conflicting accounts of the out-of-state consequences of same-sex
marriage decision-making, it is hard to assess long-term national consequences ex post. See
supra text accompanying notes 5-6 (Hawaii), 12-13 (Massachusetts).
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Second, dramatic changes in the financing and salience of state judicial
elections inevitably call attention to the importance of consequences to state
court decision-making (especially given the U.S. Supreme Court's increasingly
hands-off approach to state decision-making). Correspondingly, it is important
to recognize that "state constitutional law is less circumscribed by legal norms
and more defined by political coalition-building and mobilization."339
Whatever one thinks about the desirability of such overtly politicized
constitutional discourse, 340 it is nonetheless true that state justices running in
contested races will be under intense pressure to act like other politicians
seeking reelection. 341 For much the same reason, it is important to recognize
that the backlash calculations of justices in states with contested elections are
likely to be very different than the calculations of justices in other states,
especially states that do not make use of elections. All of this is to say that the
issues discussed in this Article are of increasing national import-but that the
examination of these issues must recognize fundamental differences among
state systems.

339. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 875 (1999) (arguing that state judges no
longer unilaterally determine the meaning of state constitutional provisions but, instead,
share that responsibility with voters).
340. In particular, the academic debates over both constitutional dialogues (between
branches of the federal government) and popular constitutionalism (between the people and
other parts of government) have received some but not much attention in the literature.
Given the increasing importance of state constitutionalism, there should be increasing
attention to transporting to the state court context these debates over the respective roles of
elected officials and voters in shaping constitutions.
341. For additional discussion, see Pozen, supra note 157 (noting, among other things,
that there is an inverse relationship between judicial elections achieving legitimacy as
elections and the costs of judicial elections to both the courts' legitimacy and the judiciary's
distinctive role in our system of government).
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